All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format is based on Keep a Changelog. Public functions and behaviour contracts remain compatible within 2.x where security permits; security and correctness fixes may tighten validation or derived defaults in a minor release.

[2.28.0] - 2026-11-16

Added

  • Attesto.Plug.ResourceAuthenticate's :principal callback can return {:error, {:temporarily_unavailable, reason}}, the result a verifier already returns for an outage. It is answered with the same 503 temporarily_unavailable, with no challenge and no Retry-After, and the reason is discarded. Until now it got 401 invalid_token, which a client can take to mean its token is bad, for example while the database holding principals is unavailable. Every other result still gets 401, and an exception the callback raises still reaches the host's error handling.
  • :principal_unavailable_send_error on the same plug renders that 503 and lets an adapter record it as :principal_unavailable, apart from :verifier_unavailable and :policy_rejected. Without it, :send_error renders the response.

[2.27.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 answers invalid_request when a parameter defined as a single string arrives as anything else: a list, a map, a number, a boolean or nil. Until now state, prompt, login_hint and the other optional ones were dropped as if absent. A non-string scope is invalid_request, where it was invalid_scope. A non-string client_id or redirect_uri is still answered directly, since there is no trusted address to redirect to; the others are redirected. Pushed authorization requests are parsed the same way. Request Object values are unaffected: they are converted to strings before validation, as before.

[2.26.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.DPoP.ReplayCache starts only with single_node?: true in its start options, a statement by the host that the deployment runs one node. Without it the cache refuses to start, with or without connected BEAM peers, and it no longer accepts :multi_node_acknowledged?. Change Attesto.DPoP.ReplayCache in a supervision tree to {Attesto.DPoP.ReplayCache, single_node?: true}. A deployment with more than one node configures a shared :replay_check on every node and does not supervise the cache. Until now nodes that were not connected as a BEAM cluster each kept their own cache and nothing failed at boot.
  • The one Logger.error message is a fixed string, with the store module and the connected nodes in the Logger metadata keys :store and :peers. The README lists the message and the formatter setting that prints the keys.

Added

[2.25.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.Keystore.rotation_health/2 now exercises the signing key with a fixed diagnostic message and verifies it against the published public key. :signing_key_mismatch makes the result :invalid, including signing failures. An Attesto.Signer callback is invoked, with its latency and cost.
  • Private JWK signing now requires an absent key_ops or a string list containing sign, and an absent use or sig. Attesto.DPoP.Proof.build/4 refuses incompatible usage. Attesto.Key.public_map/1 omits private-key operation metadata when deriving the public half; public-only verification material retains its restrictions.

Added

  • Attesto.Key.validate_kid/3 checks identifier requirements against the full key set before candidate filtering. Its :require_kid policy supports always requiring an identifier or requiring one for a set with multiple keys.
  • Attesto.Key.import_pem/1 returns matchable :malformed_key and :unsupported_key reasons without exposing key material. The existing raising PEM helpers remain available.
  • Attesto.Key.signing_jwk/1 accepts private JWK maps and JOSE.JWK values as well as PEMs and validates their signing permissions.

[2.24.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.OutboundTarget.screen/2 preserves the original :url and returns all checked IP tuples in :addresses, in resolution order, alongside :host and :authority. Callers must dial those addresses through Attesto.PinnedHTTP.
  • Attesto.PinnedHTTP.request/2, request_inline/2 and passive_request/2 take a screened target and an options list. The previous positional APIs are removed. :deadline is an absolute monotonic millisecond deadline; :body_limit, :connect_timeout (3,000 ms) and :max_attempts (3) bound work. Failed connects retry on fresh sockets, rotating checked addresses. Nothing is retried after the request starts. Connect failures now return {:error, {:not_sent, cause}}, including :deadline_exceeded, rather than an undifferentiated transport error or timeout. Failures after the request starts return {:error, {:maybe_sent, cause}}. All three entry points use normalized transport/protocol causes, :deadline_exceeded, :too_large or :invalid_request; no Mint error struct leaves the module. No stored data changes.

Added

[2.23.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.CodeStore is now one required behaviour with explicit live, claimed and redeemed states. Reads never write; atomic claim, replay flagging and finish callbacks retain immutable bindings and redemption records, with one revocation flag for replay or grant cut-off. Access-token linkage and revocation callbacks are required. Custom stores must migrate to this contract; the upgrade guide maps every previous callback.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationCode.redeem/4 compares client, redirect URI, PKCE when challenged and DPoP when bound before any state change. A failed comparison no longer spends the code. Reuse revocation applies only to a matching presentation, including after code expiry and during token issuance. Expiry prevents claiming live codes only. This departs from the literal wording of RFC 6749 §4.1.2 so possession of a code alone cannot revoke another client's tokens.
  • Authorization-code redemption always requires the bound client identifier; the client-id opt-out is removed. A verifier presented for a code issued without a PKCE challenge is refused.

[2.22.0] - 2026-11-15

Added

  • Attesto.Plug.ProtectResource protects one OAuth resource in one plug: resource-bound authentication, principal loading and per-route scopes, with prepare/1, authenticate/2 and authorize/3 for a route that decides its scopes per request. Attesto.Plug.ResourceAuthenticate and Attesto.Plug.ResourceScopes are the two steps on their own. resource_audience: :resource derives the token audience from a pinned :base_url or :origin and the :resource_path; the request Host never chooses it. An explicit audience policy is required, a mount that accepts DPoP needs its pin at boot, and an http pin is accepted only on a loopback host under allow_http: true.
  • Attesto.ResourceMetadata builds an RFC 9728 document per resource and Attesto.Plug.ResourceMetadata serves it, publicly cacheable only when the resource is statically pinned. Each resource declares its own :scopes_supported.

[2.21.0] - 2026-11-15

Breaking

  • Attesto.SigningAlg.infer/1 and Attesto.Federation.EntityStatement infer the RFC 9864 identifiers "Ed25519" and "Ed448" for OKP keys, where 2.20.0 inferred "EdDSA". A host with an Ed25519 or Ed448 signing key and no explicit algorithm signs new tokens with the curve-specific identifier and publishes it as the JWKS alg; keeping the same key does not keep the old identifier. Verification accepts "EdDSA" and the curve-specific identifier for an OKP key on the matching curve, within any explicit :accepted_algs, so tokens signed before the upgrade still verify. A relying party whose JOSE library does not know the RFC 9864 identifiers rejects the new tokens; set "EdDSA" in keystore metadata to keep the old identifier.
  • Attesto.SdJwtVc.verify/3, Attesto.Mdoc.verify/3, Attesto.Mdoc.verify_device_response/4 and Attesto.VpToken.verify/2 fetch and enforce a credential's status reference by default, through Attesto.StatusList.fetch/3. A revoked or suspended credential, an invalid list and a failed fetch are errors. resolve_status: false skips the check for offline inspection; a 1- or 2-arity function replaces the fetch. Status 1 returns :credential_revoked, 2 returns :credential_suspended, and any other non-zero value returns {:credential_status, value}.
  • Attesto.SdJwtVc follows draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-26: issue/2 emits and verify/3 accepts typ: "dc+sd-jwt" only. "vc+sd-jwt" is refused.
  • Attesto.ClientIdMetadata follows draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03. It refuses a Client Identifier URL whose path is "/"; treats a document with neither token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported nor token_endpoint_auth_method as "none"; prefers the plural member and refuses a singular value that is not in it; refuses symmetric methods in either member; requires jwks or jwks_uri for private_key_jwt and refuses both together; and refuses a redirect URI whose query carries an authorization request or response parameter.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.resolve_request_object/2 and validate/2 answer :invalid_request_object for an alg: "none" request object when require_request_object: true is set, where they answered :request_not_supported.

Added

  • Attesto.StatusList verifies JWT and CWT status lists and ISO mdoc identifier lists (check_status/4, verify_cwt/3, verify_identifier_list_cwt/3) and issues the CWT forms (issue_cwt/4, issue_identifier_list_cwt/4). fetch/3 is a bounded HTTPS fetcher: it screens the target address, pins the connection, refuses redirects, requires the requested media type, and needs the optional :mint dependency. Attesto.Mdoc reads and issues MSO status references and exposes peek_status/1.
  • Attesto.StatusList.Cache holds lists fetched by the default fetcher. Only a list that verified is stored, a hit is verified again under the caller's trust, and an entry expires at the earliest of its signed ttl, its signed exp and five minutes. It holds at most 64 entries and 16 MiB. A custom resolver is cached only with cache_status: true.
  • Attesto.CredentialEncryption: OpenID4VCI 1.0 Credential Request decryption and Credential Response encryption (ECDH-ES on P-256 with A128GCM or A256GCM), recipient key validation, and the credential_request_encryption and credential_response_encryption metadata blocks. A wallet may request zip: "DEF" for the response; Attesto.JWE.encrypt_deflated/4 compresses outbound plaintext only, and every inbound JWE path still refuses zip. Attesto.CredentialIssuerMetadata accepts :credential_request_encryption and refuses a key that carries private JWK members.
  • Attesto.IdentityAssertion.sign/3 signs a JWT authorization grant as the configured issuer, with typ: "oauth-id-jag+jwt" by default or "JWT" for a plain RFC 7523 grant used in identity chaining. Missing or malformed attributes return :missing_claim or :invalid_claims.
  • Attesto.PinnedHTTP: a one-shot Mint connection to a caller-screened address that keeps TLS SNI and hostname verification on the original host, with bounded response reads. Requires the optional :mint >= 1.10.2 and < 2.0.0.
  • Attesto.CodeStore has an optional pending_revoked?/1 callback, implemented by Attesto.CodeStore.ETS. Attesto.AuthorizationCode.issue_refresh_and_finalize/6 uses it to revoke the refresh family and access token of a code that was taken before a subject, client or session revocation and finalized after it. A custom store that does not implement the callback keeps that race.
  • Attesto.X509.verify/2 returns the selected :trust_anchor.
  • Attesto.Cose.peek_headers/2; Attesto.Cose.sign1/3 takes :typ, :tagged and :protected_x5chain; Attesto.Cose.verify1/3 takes :allow_tagged.
  • Attesto.DPoP.Proof.build/4 and Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 take allow_http: true to accept an http htu on a loopback host.
  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate.normalize_options/2 validates plug options for a wrapper plug that supplies :htu per request.
  • Attesto.Scope.new_catalog/2 takes :hierarchy, a map from a broader scope to the scopes it implies; Attesto.Plug.RequireScopes takes :scope_hierarchy.
  • Attesto.RedirectURI.reserved_query_params/0 and reserved_query_param?/1 detect a redirect URI whose query carries an authorization request or response parameter.
  • Attesto.ClientIdMetadata.auth_methods/1 returns the token endpoint authentication methods a CIMD document declares.

Changed

  • Attesto.StatusList.verify/3 and Attesto.SdJwt compare the typ header as a media type, so "application/statuslist+jwt" and "application/dc+sd-jwt" are accepted beside the short forms.
  • ID tokens, request objects, SIOP, credential proofs and requests, key attestations and federation statements share one implementation of audience, nonce, expiry and trusted-key signature checks.

[2.20.0] - 2026-11-14

Security

  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate.init/1 now raises ArgumentError when DPoP is accepted (accepts_dpop?/1: a 2-arity :replay_check function or dpop_replay_unprotected_acknowledged?: true) without a pinned :origin or a 1-arity :htu callback, or when :htu is not a 1-arity function. It no longer falls back to the request Host header, and a nil return from :htu is refused. Bearer-only mounts (where DPoP replay checking is omitted and dpop_replay_unprotected_acknowledged? is not true) are unaffected.
  • Attesto.PairwiseSubject now restricts sector_identifier/1 to non-loopback https redirect URIs sharing one host and provides seal_subject/3 / unseal_subject/3 (block-padded AES-256-GCM with per-token derived keys and pairwise_sub AAD) so Attesto.Token.mint/3 (via :pairwise) carries the derived pairwise sub in pairwise access tokens instead of exposing the host subject to pairwise clients. Same-deployment callers verifying pairwise tokens via Attesto.Token.verify/3 must pass :pairwise_subject_salt.
  • Attesto.X509.verify/2 now enforces constraints (including BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, pathLenConstraint, and NameConstraints) on both self-signed and non-self-signed CA trust anchors via :public_key.pkix_path_validation/3, refuses non-CA certificates used to issue chains, enforces CA dNSName NameConstraints against leaf uniformResourceIdentifier SAN hosts unless the CA defines a permitted URI subtree, rejects MD5 and SHA-1 signatures anywhere in the chain, and returns :untrusted_certificate under :haip when the leaf is self-signed or any chain certificate matches a trust anchor (was :invalid_certificate).
  • Attesto.Key.public_map/1 and Attesto.Cose refuse JWK Sets (%{"keys" => _}) where a single JWK is expected.
  • Attesto.CIBA bounds binding_message by UTF-8 byte length rather than only grapheme count and rejects C1 control characters in CIBA display text.
  • Attesto.ClientIdMetadata requires a non-empty grant_types list in client metadata documents.
  • Attesto.IPAddress refuses IPv4-mapped networks and IPv6 zone IDs in CIDR lists.
  • Attesto.SessionState.origin/1 refuses userinfo and percent-encoded hosts in origin comparison.
  • Attesto.DeviceCodeStore.ETS, Attesto.CIBAStore.ETS, and Attesto.PreAuthorizedCodeStore.ETS implement delete_unconsumed/1 for subject, client, and session revocation across unconsumed pending and approved grants.

Breaking

Added

[2.19.0] - 2026-11-13

Added

  • Attesto.URI.put_query_params/3 adds response parameters to a registered redirect URI's query. A registered pair whose name the response sets, or that :replace names, is dropped first; every other registered pair is kept byte for byte (RFC 6749 §3.1.2). A registered https://rp.example/cb?state=static no longer yields ?state=static&state=abc123, where a first-value parser reads the registered value.

Fixed

[2.18.0] - 2026-11-12

Added

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.check_prompt_login/4 checks whether a host's auth_time satisfies prompt=login against a supplied request or park time, with explicit allowance, current-time, and future-skew options. The function has no clock or store side effects (OpenID Connect Core §3.1.2.1, §3.1.2.3).
  • Attesto.EndSession.parse/3 and Attesto.IDToken.verify_logout_hint/3 accept require_typ: true, off by default. Missing required types use the existing invalid-hint/type errors. JWT media types JWT and application/jwt are accepted case-insensitively by ID Token verification (RFC 8725 §3.11; RFC 7515 §4.1.9).
  • Optional Attesto.RefreshStore.with_family_lock/2 callback serializes retry recovery with rotation and revocation. Recovery re-reads the parent and successor under the lock when available (RFC 9700 §4.14.2; RFC 7009 §2.1). Store behaviours document the code/refresh-table and family lock order.

[2.17.0] - 2026-11-12

Added

  • Attesto.VpToken.verify/2 and Attesto.Mdoc.session_transcript/1 accept :dc_api_origin to select the Digital Credentials API mdoc handover from OpenID4VP 1.0 §B.2.6.2. It binds the exact origin without an origin: prefix, nonce, and response encryption key thumbprint when present. Redirect verification remains the default (§B.2.6.1).
  • mdoc issuerAuth verification accepts ES384/P-384 and ES512/P-521 through :accepted_algs, following ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 §9.1.2.4 and RFC 9053 §2.1. ES256 remains the default. Algorithm/curve mismatches return :algorithm_key_mismatch, including for validated X.509 leaf keys. Device authentication remains ES256/P-256 only (§9.1.3.6).

[2.16.0] - 2026-11-12

Fixed

Added

  • Attesto.VpToken.verify/2 accepts :trusted_certificates as a third, mutually exclusive issuer trust source, with :certificate_trust and :haip options. Attesto.PresentationSession stores DER anchors as {:trusted_certificates, anchors} and forwards those two verification options without storing the callback.
  • Attesto.Mdoc validates issuerAuth's x5chain (COSE label 33) against configured anchors and verifies the signature using only the validated leaf key (ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 §§9.1.2.4, 9.3.1–9.3.3). A missing or malformed chain is an error. No certificate-name binding to docType is imposed; the MSO-to-document docType check remains (§9.3.1 step 4). The default haip: true refuses self-signed leaves and embedded anchors; HAIP 1.0 §6.1.1 directly specifies these restrictions for SD-JWT VC, while ISO Annex B.1.1 excludes the IACA root from mdoc x5chain.

[2.15.0] - 2026-11-12

Security

  • Attesto.Cose and Attesto.Mdoc refuse CBOR in which a map repeats a key. A COSE_Sign1 whose protected or unprotected header named a label twice was accepted: the general-purpose decoder builds a map as it reads, so one of the two entries was dropped before any check ran, and with two different values the one kept was whichever came last. RFC 9052 §3 says "if a label appears multiple times, the message MUST be rejected as malformed". The same applied to every map in an mdoc DeviceResponse, IssuerSigned structure and Mobile Security Object. All of them are now decoded through Attesto.StrictCBOR, and such input is :invalid_cose or :invalid_mdoc. Two keys count as the same when they decode to the same value, so a key repeated in a non-minimal or indefinite-length encoding is refused too.

  • Attesto.Mdoc.verify_device_response/4 checks device-signed data elements against the Mobile Security Object's keyAuthorizations. ISO/IEC 18013-5 §9.1.3.4 says "the mdoc reader shall validate this authorization as part of validating the mdoc authentication". Until now a DeviceSigned element in any namespace was returned in device_namespaces as long as the device signature verified. An element whose namespace is not authorized in full and which is not listed by name for its namespace is now refused with {:error, :unauthorized_device_element}. A presentation with no device-signed elements is unaffected.

    Behaviour change: a credential whose issuer set no keyAuthorizations authorizes no device-signed element, so a presentation of it that carries one is refused where it used to be accepted. Attesto.VpToken evaluates DCQL claims against issuer-signed namespaces only, so query results do not change; a host that reads device_namespaces is affected.

  • Attesto.SdJwt.verify_key_binding/3 enforces a Key Binding JWT's exp and nbf when the holder included them. Only iat was read, so a binding with an exp in the past, an nbf in the future, or a non-numeric value for either was accepted while its iat was within the freshness window (300 seconds by default). RFC 9901 §7.3 requires the Key Binding JWT to be "a valid JWT in all other respects, per [RFC7519]", and RFC 7519 §4.1.4 / §4.1.5 say a JWT MUST NOT be accepted on or after exp or before nbf. Both are checked with the 60 seconds of clock allowance iat already had, and a value that is not a non-negative integer is refused. Both claims remain optional.

Fixed

  • Attesto.StatusList.verify/3 refuses a status list whose ZLIB stream is cut short. The stream was read as a complete, shorter list: entries in the part that survived answered with their real values and an index in the missing part failed as out of range. No index could be read as a different status than the full list gives, and the list is inside the issuer's signature, so only the Status Issuer can produce one. It is now :invalid_status_list, as a list that fails its checksum already was. Bytes after the end of a complete stream are still ignored.

Added

  • Attesto.StrictCBOR.decode/2 decodes one CBOR data item and refuses a map with a repeated key at any depth, input nested deeper than :max_depth (default 32), trailing bytes, and input longer than :max_bytes. It is the CBOR counterpart of Attesto.StrictJSON.
  • Attesto.Mdoc.issue/1 takes :key_authorizations (:name_spaces and/or :data_elements) and writes it to the Mobile Security Object's deviceKeyInfo.keyAuthorizations (ISO/IEC 18013-5 §9.1.2.4). An issuer that wants holders to present device-signed elements has to set it. Attesto.Mdoc.verify/3 returns the authorizations as :key_authorizations.
  • Attesto.X509.verify/2 validates a leaf-first DER certificate chain against explicit trust anchors using OTP PKIX and returns the verified leaf public JWK and authority key identifiers. It bounds chain length and certificate size, enforces signing key usage and RSA parameters, supports the mdoc document-signer purpose, and applies optional host policy after validation. decode_x5c/1 decodes bounded JOSE certificate chains. haip: true refuses self-signed leaves and embedded trust anchors (HAIP 1.0 §6.1.1).
  • Attesto.X509.matches_issuer?/2 binds a validated leaf to an HTTPS issuer using URI SANs first, then DNS SANs only when no URI SAN exists. SD-JWT VC draft -08 §3.5 describes both name forms but gives neither precedence; URI precedence is an explicit stricter policy. HAIP references draft -13 §3.5, which identifies the issuer by its certificate subject. Draft -26 §2.5 permits issuer binding policy and does not authenticate iss merely from a trusted certificate path.
  • Attesto.SdJwtVc.verify/3 accepts :trusted_certificates to opt into x5c path validation, leaf-key signature verification, and binding to a required signed iss. This mode defaults to haip: true, accepts an additional :certificate_trust callback, and never falls back to caller-supplied keys. Verification without this option retains the existing behavior.

[2.14.0] - 2026-11-11

Changed

  • Attesto.Token.verify/3 checks the JOSE header typ of an access token. RFC 9068 §4 says a resource server MUST verify that the header typ is at+jwt (or application/at+jwt) and reject any other value. Until now only the typ claim was checked. The expected value is config.access_token_header_typ, compared case-insensitively with an optional application/ prefix (RFC 7515 §4.1.9); a mismatch or a missing header is {:error, :invalid_typ}. Refresh tokens carry no header typ and are not held to one, and a configuration with access_token_header_typ: nil skips the check.

    Behaviour change: an access token without the header is refused. That is a token minted by a release from before the header existed, a token minted while access_token_header_typ was nil and verified after it was set, or a hand-built token that never carried one. Attesto.Token.mint/3 sets the header by default (access_token_header_typ: "at+jwt"). Access tokens live 15 minutes by default, so refusals of older tokens stop within one token lifetime of the upgrade.

  • Attesto.OutboundTarget.screen/2 with allow_loopback: true accepts http only when every address the host resolves to is a loopback address. The option was documented as a development escape hatch for loopback, but it also let plain http reach a public address.

  • Attesto.URI.https_identifier?/2 refuses a host that contains a percent-encoded character (https://auth.example%20evil/) or an empty label (https://auth.example../). Neither is a name any issuer or endpoint metadata carries, and a host that reads as a name only after decoding is not the name it appears to be. One trailing dot, the fully qualified form, is still accepted. An upper-case scheme (HTTPS://) was and is accepted: it is lower-cased when the value is parsed (RFC 3986 §3.1). Attesto.OutboundTarget.screen/2 applies the same host rule and returns {:error, :invalid_url}. An OpenID Federation Entity Identifier with such a host is no longer an identifier, so an Entity Statement naming one cannot be built.

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 answers a request parameter given more than once (a list or map value) with a redirectable invalid_request (RFC 6749 §3.1). It used to ignore the parameter and process the outer parameters as though no Request Object had been sent. An empty request is still treated as omitted, as that section requires.

Added

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 takes request_objects_supported: false for a server that does not support the request parameter. A request carrying a Request Object is then answered request_not_supported (OIDC Core §3.1.2.6). The default, true, keeps invalid_request_object for an object that cannot be verified, including one from a client with no usable keys.
  • Attesto.OutboundTarget.screen/2 takes allowed_cidrs:, a list of CIDR blocks naming non-public networks a destination may resolve into, for a service reachable only at a private address. Every resolved address must be public or inside a listed block. There is no host-name form: allowing a name would trust its DNS answer. The list is an SSRF exception the operator takes on, and it never applies to plain http.
  • Attesto.IPAddress.parse_cidrs!/1 and in_any_cidr?/2. Parsing refuses a malformed block, a block with host bits set, and a zero-length prefix, which would match every address.
  • Attesto.URI.valid_host?/1 and loopback_host?/1, and the allow_loopback_http: true option of https_identifier?/2, which accepts http only for localhost and literal loopback addresses.

Documentation

  • Attesto.RefreshToken states what happens when a consumed refresh token is presented under another client: the family is revoked, as for any reuse (RFC 9700 §4.14.2), and the client is not consulted first. A public client has no credential behind client_id, so a check would stop nothing, and for a confidential client a consumed token under another client is the leak signal reuse detection exists for. An unconsumed token presented with the wrong client still fails with :client_mismatch and is left untouched.

[2.13.0] - 2026-11-11

Changed

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.supported_response_modes/0 includes "form_post" (OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode), after "query". validate/2 accepts response_mode=form_post unless :response_modes_supported leaves it out; it used to answer a redirectable invalid_request. Rendering the form is the authorization endpoint's work. Plain fragment stays unsupported.

Fixed

  • Attesto.ProtectedResourceMetadata.metadata/2 omits a member whose value is an empty list. It used to publish the empty array, and RFC 9728 §3.2 says "Parameters with zero values MUST be omitted from the response". bearer_methods_supported is the exception and is still published as []: §2 gives that value a meaning of its own, that no bearer methods are supported.

Added

  • Attesto.PairwiseSubject holds the two pairwise subject identifier rules of OpenID Connect Core §8.1: sector_identifier/1 (the one host a client's redirect URIs share; sector_identifier_uri is not implemented) and derive/3 (HMAC-SHA256 of the sector identifier and local subject under a salt of at least 32 bytes).
  • Attesto.OpenIDDiscovery.metadata/2 accepts :subject_types_supported (default ["public"]) and :userinfo_signing_alg_values_supported, and Attesto.OpenIDDiscovery.signing_algs/1 is public.
  • Attesto.SignedUserInfo.response_jwt/4 signs a UserInfo response for a client that registered userinfo_signed_response_alg, with iss and aud (OpenID Connect Core §5.3.2). It refuses any algorithm other than the current signing key's.
  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate.accepts_dpop?/1 reports whether a plug built from the given options can accept a DPoP request: :replay_check is wired, or dpop_replay_unprotected_acknowledged?: true is set. It is the rule the plug already applied, now public so resource metadata can advertise DPoP only where the plug accepts it.
  • Attesto.CodeStore has an optional delete_unconsumed/1 callback and Attesto.RefreshStore an optional revoke_families/1 callback. Each takes criteria (:subject, :client_id and/or :sid, ANDed) and returns {:ok, count}: the unredeemed codes deleted, or the families revoked. Attesto.CodeStore.ETS and Attesto.RefreshStore.ETS implement them. Redeemed codes keep their reuse markers. Neither callback touches access tokens already issued; a self-contained JWT access token stays valid until it expires unless the protected resource consults introspection or a denylist.
  • Attesto.RevocationCriteria validates those criteria and decides whether a stored grant matches them. Empty criteria are refused. :sid_claim names the claims member that holds the session identifier (default "sid").
  • Attesto.EndSession.parse/3 takes on_invalid_hint: :discard. An id_token_hint that fails verification then yields a request with id_token_hint: :invalid and no client, subject, sid, post_logout_redirect_uri or state, so the OP can ask the End-User whether to log out and never redirects for it (RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2, §4). The default, :reject, returns {:error, :invalid_id_token_hint} as before.
  • %Attesto.EndSession{} has an :id_token_hint field: :verified, :absent or :invalid.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.check_auth_time/4 checks an authentication event against a validated request's max_age (OIDC Core §3.1.2.1). It returns :ok, or {:error, :auth_time_required | :invalid_auth_time | :max_age_exceeded}. :allowance adds seconds to max_age for an authorization server that re-authenticated the End-User and came back to finish the same request; :future_skew bounds an auth_time ahead of the clock. A request without max_age always returns :ok.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 accepts :response_modes_supported, a non-empty subset of supported_response_modes/0. A request for a mode outside the list is a redirectable invalid_request. A request with no response_mode asks for query, so it is refused the same way when "query" is not listed. A redirectable error is delivered in the requested mode only when that mode is in the list. Without the option every supported mode is accepted, as before. response_modes!/1 checks such a list and raises ArgumentError for a bad one.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest carries id_token_hint and login_hint (OIDC Core §3.1.2.1) as the client sent them, nil when absent. After a pushed authorization request the raw parameters hold only request_uri, so the validated request was the only place a host could not read them. id_token_hint is not verified by validate/2; a host that acts on it verifies it first.
  • Attesto.IDToken.max_lifetime_seconds/0 returns the longest ID Token lifetime mint/4 issues (3600 seconds), so a layer that exposes the lifetime as configuration can validate against it.

[2.12.0] - 2026-11-09

Security

  • Refuse a JWK that carries a keys member wherever one key is expected. JOSE parses a map with both kty and keys as the outer key with the inner keys attached, and Attesto.JWS.verify_trusted/4 expanded any map with a keys list into those keys. A proof whose jwk header named one key and listed another under keys was therefore validated and thumbprinted as the first key and signature-checked against the second. Anyone who knew a public key could pass proof of possession for it with a key of their own:
    • Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 returned the jkt of a key that had not signed the proof, so a party holding a DPoP-bound access token could present it without the bound private key.
    • Attesto.Siop.verify/2 accepted a Self-Issued ID Token for a subject whose key had not signed it.
    • Attesto.CredentialProof.verify_jwt/2 returned the named key as the proven key, including under require_key_attestation: true when the attestation covered only the named key. A credential issued to the returned jwk carried the keys member in cnf, and its SD-JWT key binding then verified against the inner key.
    • The wallet attestation proof of possession in Attesto.WalletAttestation passed its key the same way. Attesto.Key.verification_jwk/2 now returns :malformed_jwk for a map with a keys member or without a string kty, verify_trusted/4 treats a map with kty as one key, and those verifiers pass their key as a one-element list so it is never expanded.
  • Return an error instead of not terminating when a JWK Set is given where one JWK is expected. JOSE does not return from its thumbprint or public-map conversion for a set, an empty one included, so a jwk header such as {"keys": []}, or a kty-bearing key with a nested {"keys": []}, held the verifying process until its caller timed out. This was reachable without authentication through the DPoP, OpenID4VCI proof and SIOP verifiers, did:jwk resolution, and the jwks of a self-signed Entity Configuration. Attesto.Thumbprint.of_jwk/1 returns :malformed_jwk, Attesto.Did.resolve/2 returns :invalid_jwk, Attesto.SigningAlg.infer/1 raises ArgumentError for a parsed set, and Attesto.JWE, Attesto.JwtVc and the COSE verifier refuse the map before parsing it.
  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate built the URI a DPoP proof's htu is compared against from the request's scheme, Host header, and port unless an :htu callback was given. A resource server that answers requests whatever their Host therefore accepted a proof made for a different server: a party that received a DPoP-bound access token and its proof, for a token whose audience this server also accepts, could replay both here with the other server's name in Host. RFC 9449 §4.3 binds the proof to its target URI to prevent exactly this. The new :origin option names the origin clients address the resource server by, such as "https://api.example"; with it, the htu is that origin followed by the request path, and the request's scheme, Host, and port are not consulted. The default is unchanged because the configuration does not say where a resource server is reachable. A host that accepts DPoP-bound tokens through this plug should set :origin, or :htu when it answers on several origins or behind a path-rewriting proxy. init/1 raises ArgumentError for an :origin that is not an https URL with a host and no path, userinfo, query, or fragment, and when both :origin and :htu are set.
  • Match OpenID Federation naming constraints against a host that HTTP clients resolve the same way. Attesto.Federation.TrustChain.validate/3 compared each Entity Identifier's host as URI.parse/1 returns it, with percent-encoding intact, so a Subordinate Statement could name an entity inside an excluded domain by escaping part of its host: https://leaf.bad%2eexample passed an exclusion of .bad.example, and common HTTP clients decode that host to leaf.bad.example. On the permitted side, a host such as evil.test%2F.good.example matched .good.example by suffix. A host that is not a DNS name of letter, digit, and hyphen labels, the syntax the constraints themselves must use, now satisfies no naming constraint, and the chain fails with :constraint_violation when a naming constraint applies to it. Under a naming constraint this also refuses a host containing _ or an IPv6 literal. Chains without naming constraints are unaffected.
  • Refuse a did:web path segment that percent-decodes to . or .., or to a value containing / or \. Attesto.Did.resolve/2 refused the literal dot-segments but returned {:needs_fetch, "https://example.com/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/admin/did.json"} for did:web:example.com:%2e%2e:%2e%2e:admin, and a URL ending in /a%2Fb/did.json for did:web:example.com:a%2Fb. RFC 3986 makes %2e equivalent to ., and a server or proxy that decodes the path before removing dot-segments, or that splits on a decoded slash, serves a document outside the path the DID names. A host that allow-lists did:web documents by path prefix relied on that not happening. These DIDs now return {:error, :invalid_web_did}, with or without a :resolver.

Added

Changed

  • Attesto.DPoP.allowed_algs/0 caches the algorithms it discovers from the JOSE backend, keyed by that backend's configuration: the crypto fallback setting, the Curve25519, Curve448, and SHA-3 modules, and FIPS mode. Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 also refuses an alg outside its fixed list before consulting the backend. Unless prime_allowed_algs/0 had been called, every proof, an unauthenticated one with alg: "none" included, ran JOSE.JWA.supports/0 before its signature was checked, and that call costs more than verifying an ES256 proof. A backend change made through JOSE's or :crypto's functions is still picked up on the next call. clear_allowed_algs_cache/0 now drops the cached result so that the next call discovers it again, rather than switching to discovery on every call; prime_allowed_algs/0 still pins a snapshot that ignores backend changes.

Fixed

  • Pass over a key in a trusted JWK Set that is well formed but cannot verify a signature, instead of treating the whole set as malformed. A client or identity provider that published an encryption key beside its signing keys (use: "enc", key_ops without verify, an alg such as RSA-OAEP or ECDH-ES, or an X25519 or X448 key) got :invalid_signature for every assertion from Attesto.ClientAssertion.verify/5 and Attesto.IdentityAssertion.verify/3, even when the header kid selected the signing key. The wallet attestation, key attestation, request object, JWT VC, and trust mark verifiers rejected such a set the same way. RFC 7517 §5 has a reader ignore these keys, and keys of a type it does not implement. They are now skipped, and the signature is checked against the remaining keys. A key that is not a single public JWK, carries private members, cannot be parsed, or has a use, key_ops, or alg member of the wrong JSON type still makes the set fail. Entity Statement verification keeps requiring every key in a federation jwks to be a signing key.
  • Verify a trusted JWK that has no alg member with any algorithm its key type and curve support, within the verifier's accepted algorithms. Such a key was bound to the one algorithm Attesto.SigningAlg.infer/1 derives, RS256 for RSA and EdDSA for Ed25519, so a correctly signed JWS under another algorithm returned :invalid_signature. An RSA client key without alg could not authenticate with any algorithm under the default FAPI list of Attesto.ClientAssertion.verify/5, which excludes RS256, and an Ed25519 key without alg refused the RFC 9864 Ed25519 identifier. RFC 7517 §4.4 places no restriction on a key that omits alg. Such a key is now tried with the algorithm in the JWS header when its type can verify it, and is passed over when it cannot; the accepted list still decides which algorithms are used, and a key with an alg member is used with that algorithm only.
  • Accept an OpenID Federation Trust Chain that ends with the Trust Anchor's Entity Configuration. OpenID Federation 1.0 §4 has a chain end with that configuration and lets it be omitted, but Attesto.Federation.TrustChain.validate/3 accepted only the abbreviated form and returned :broken_trust_chain for the full one. A trailing self-issued statement after at least one Subordinate Statement is now verified with the out-of-band Trust Anchor keys, its jwks verify the Trust Anchor's Subordinate Statement, it must configure the issuer of that statement, and its exp counts toward the chain's exp.
  • Keep the full grant on a rotated refresh token when the refresh request names a narrower scope or resource. Attesto.RefreshToken.rotate/3 stored the requested subset as the successor's scope and resource set, so one down-scoped refresh permanently removed the rest of the grant from the family. RFC 6749 §6 requires a new refresh token's scope to be identical to the presented token's, and RFC 8707 §2.2 keeps a refresh token bound to the full original grant. Rotated refresh tokens now keep the full grant: the successor copies the parent's scope and resource set unchanged, and the requested subset applies only to the returned context, which the caller mints the access token from. A later refresh can obtain the full grant again. A request outside the grant is still :invalid_scope or :invalid_target and does not consume the token. A lost-response retry inside :rotation_grace_seconds no longer has to repeat the original request's scope and resource: it receives the same successor and a context for its own requested subset, while a retry from another client or binding, or one requesting anything outside the grant, still revokes the family. Attesto.RefreshStore.ETS.rotate/4 returns {:error, :invalid_rotation} for a child whose scope or resource set differs from its parent's. The Attesto.RefreshStore callbacks are unchanged, and an adapter that accepted a narrower child needs no change.

[2.11.0] - 2026-11-05

Security

  • Refuse a cnf claim that is present with a JSON null value, in Attesto.Token.verify/3 and Attesto.Token.check_confirmation/2 (:unsupported_confirmation) and in Attesto.JwtVc.verify/3 (:invalid_cnf). Both looked cnf up with Map.get, so a nil value read as an absent claim: an access token passed as an unbound bearer token and a JWT VC as a credential with no holder binding. Whether a verified null arrived as nil depended on JOSE's JSON backend. The builtin OTP backend, JOSE's default on OTP 27 and later, decodes it as :null, which was already refused; Jason and Poison, selected on earlier OTP releases or through config :jose, json_module: ..., decode it as nil. Claims returned by an Attesto.Plug.Authenticate :verify callback were affected under any backend when the callback decoded them itself with a decoder that maps null to nil, such as JSON.decode/1.

  • Distinguish a present JSON null from an omitted member in these checks, where an omitted member means "no restriction", so a null can no longer stand in for absence:

    • OpenID Federation constraints members max_path_length, naming_constraints, and allowed_entity_types in Attesto.Federation.TrustChain.validate/3 (:constraint_violation).
    • Status List Token exp in Attesto.StatusList.verify/3 (:invalid_status_list).
    • SD-JWT VC cnf in Attesto.SdJwtVc.verify/3, which now returns the new :invalid_cnf error for a present cnf that is not a non-empty object, null and {} included, instead of returning it as holder-binding data.
    • JWT VC vc.id and credentialSubject.id in Attesto.JwtVc.verify/3 (:invalid_vc).
    • DPoP proof ath in Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 (:invalid_ath without a bound access token, :missing_ath with one).
    • OpenID4VCI proof key_attestation header in Attesto.CredentialProof.verify_jwt/2 when key attestation is checked (:invalid_key_attestation).
    • JWK use, key_ops, and alg in Attesto.Key.verification_jwk/2 (:invalid_use / :alg_mismatch), which wallet attestation cnf keys, SD-JWT key-binding keys, and federation Entity Statement keys pass through.
    • JWE recipient-key use and alg in Attesto.JWE (:invalid_key), matching its existing handling of key_ops.

    For a signed artifact, each case needs the signer to have put null in the signed claim or protected header; none lets an attacker remove an existing signed restriction. Attesto.Key.verification_jwk/2 and Attesto.JWE also refuse a null member in a key map a caller passes directly. Under the Jason and Poison JOSE backends each null read as absent.

Changed

  • Verified JWT claims now come from Attesto's strict decode of the signed payload rather than from JOSE's fields, so a JSON null is nil at every depth whichever JSON backend JOSE selected. Under JOSE's builtin OTP backend, the default on OTP 27 and later, verified claims carried the atom :null. This applies to every Attesto JWT verifier, all of which verify through Attesto.JWS; callers that matched :null in returned claims must match nil instead. The signature is still verified by JOSE over the same bytes; only the decoded representation changes. Observable effects under the OTP backend:
    • A Request Object's nested null re-encodes as JSON null rather than the string "null".
    • An authorization_details entry with a null extension value is accepted, as it already was under Jason and Poison.
    • An Entity Statement whose metadata parameter is null is rejected with :invalid_entity_statement.
    • A federation metadata policy "value": null removes the parameter, as OpenID Federation specifies.

[2.10.0] - 2026-11-01

Added

  • Attesto.StrictJSON.decode_value/2 decodes any JSON value (object, array, or scalar) while rejecting duplicate object member names and container nesting beyond :max_json_depth (32).
  • Attesto.URI.valid_port?/2 validates that a parsed URI carries a port in 1..65_535 with no malformed, non-numeric, or empty :port segment in the raw URI string.

Changed

[2.9.0] - 2026-10-31

Added

Changed

  • Attesto.PresentationRequest.dcql_query/1 requires both elements of an mso_mdoc claim path to be non-empty strings; it accepted empty strings before.
  • Attesto.CIBA and Attesto.DeviceCode redeem, approve, and deny through one internal polling-grant engine, and their ETS reference stores share their poll, consume, and decision transitions. Outcomes, error values, and store contracts are unchanged.

[2.8.0] - 2026-10-31

Security

  • Validate arguments inside Attesto.SessionState.mint_browser_state/2 and browser_state_valid?/3, Attesto.JWS.sign_compact/3 and sign_compact_jwk/3, Attesto.Key.jwk/1 and signing_jwk/1, and Attesto.JwtVc.issue/2 instead of in function-head guards. A caller's type error now raises an ArgumentError that names the bad argument rather than a FunctionClauseError whose logged arguments include the OP browser-state secret or the private signing key. JwtVc.issue/2 also stops interpolating the PEM it was given into its own error message. Same class as Plug.Crypto CVE-2026-105963.
  • Reject an OpenID Federation Entity Identifier that carries userinfo. https://entity.example:secret@evil.example names evil.example to a fetcher and entity.example to a reader, and hands secret out as a Basic credential; identifiers now pass Attesto.URI.https_identifier?/1. Surfaced by mining the class behind go-openid-federation's October 2026 Entity Identifier fix.
  • Compare naming-constraint hosts without a trailing dot, so https://le.bad.test. can no longer step around an excluded entry for .bad.test. Same class as the FAPIgo trust-chain fix of 2026-10-04.

Added

  • Attesto.StrictJSON.decode/2 decodes JSON with duplicate object member names rejected at every nesting level and container depth bounded to 32 levels by default (:max_depth). Attesto.JWS and Attesto.JWE now delegate their strict JSON decoding to it.
  • Attesto.OutboundTarget.screen/2 validates an outbound https URL (or loopback http when allow_loopback: true), refuses userinfo, fragments, malformed percent-encoding, IP literals, localhost, .local, and single-label hosts, resolves both A and AAAA records, screens every returned address through Attesto.IPAddress.public_fetch_destination?/1 (loopback is admitted only with allow_loopback: true), and returns a %Attesto.OutboundTarget{} pinning the first verified address.
  • Attesto.Plug.OAuthError.missing_credentials/2 renders the RFC 6750 §3.1 bare Bearer challenge (401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer and {} JSON body) when credentials are absent.
  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate accepts :missing_credentials_challenge (:invalid_token default or :bare_bearer), :include_error_description, :dpop_max_age_seconds, :now, and :allow_ambient_mtls. It also distinguishes a malformed Authorization header from a missing one, fails closed when :nonce_issue returns a non-binary or :cert_der returns a non-nil non-binary, and maps {:certificate_error, reason} to invalid_token.
  • Attesto.Token.check_confirmation/2 accepts allow_ambient_mtls: true (default false) for resource-server callers that permit unprompted client certificates on tokens without cnf["x5t#S256"].

Changed

[2.7.0] - 2026-10-27

Security

  • Require JOSE 1.11.13 or later. It fixes CVE-2026-65625 through CVE-2026-65632, among them unbounded recursion when an ECDH-ES ephemeral key's type differs from the recipient key's, prime recovery from an RSA private JWK without CRT members, and acceptance of zero-padded ECDSA signatures. Attesto.JWE already rejected compressed payloads, short GCM tags, and ephemeral keys other than public P-256 keys before calling JOSE.
  • Attesto.JWS.verify_strict/3 accepts an ES256, ES256K, ES384, or ES512 signature only in the fixed-length R || S encoding of RFC 7518 §3.4, whatever the JOSE version. Earlier JOSE releases also accepted R and S padded with leading zero bytes, giving one signature many accepted encodings.

Added

  • Opt-in VM-wide DPoP capability snapshots through prime_allowed_algs/0 and clear_allowed_algs_cache/0. Hosts with a fixed crypto backend can discover signing support once before serving. Unprimed callers retain per-call discovery; priming with no supported asymmetric algorithm clears any previous snapshot and returns an error. Signature, key, claim, target, freshness, and replay verification still run for every proof.

Changed

  • JOSE 1.11.13 detects native Ed448 support and no longer enables its pure-Erlang crypto_fallback by default. Attesto.DPoP.allowed_algs/0, and the dpop_signing_alg_values_supported metadata derived from it, now include Ed448 where the crypto backend provides it, and omit any algorithm that only the fallback supplied.

[2.6.1] - 2026-10-18

Security

  • Bound JSON nesting to 32 containers when decoding compact JWS headers and claim sets, in unverified peeks and in strict verification alike, so a deeply nested segment cannot turn one bounded request into disproportionate scheduler time and process heap before any signature check. A trusted caller may raise the bound with :max_json_depth.
  • Cap the compact size each verifier reads before authentication, instead of the shared 1 MiB default: client assertions, DPoP proofs, Key Binding JWTs, and client attestation proofs of possession at 16 KiB; identity assertions, Self-Issued ID Tokens, access tokens, ID Tokens, Trust Marks, and Request Objects at 64 KiB; JWT VCs, credential proofs, key and wallet attestations, and Entity Statements at 256 KiB, matching SD-JWT presentations. Status List Tokens keep 1 MiB. JWS.peek_json/3 and JWS.protected_header/2 keep their 1 MiB default for callers that pass no bound.

[2.6.0] - 2026-10-18

Breaking

  • Durable logout-delivery integrations must require atomic lease_targets/4, acknowledge_targets/2, and release_targets/2 callbacks. Delivery targets carry a stable delivery_id; this lets workers retry failed back-channel logout deliveries without losing them or letting a stale worker acknowledge a newer lease. The callbacks are optional in the core behaviour during 2.x so existing stores still compile, while integrations such as AttestoPhoenix 4.2 validate them at startup. Custom stores must also schedule a bounded retry driver for released rows and expired leases.
  • TrustMark.verify/3 now requires an explicit non-empty :subject option so a valid Trust Mark cannot be accepted for the wrong entity.
  • Issuer-derived token and JWKS endpoint URLs now preserve issuer path prefixes. For example, issuer https://id.example/tenant derives https://id.example/tenant/oauth/token; hosts that intentionally published endpoints at the origin root must configure those endpoint URLs explicitly.

Security

  • Bind client assertions to their token-endpoint role. Verification now accepts only the absent, JWT, or client-authentication+jwt typ values, rejects authorization-request claims, and limits the remaining lifetime at verification to 300 seconds by default. Set max_lifetime: :unbounded only for an intentional exception.
  • Enforce cnf sender constraints after every custom access-token verifier and safely normalize non-text verifier errors instead of letting malformed host callback results raise while rendering an OAuth response.
  • Reject SD-JWT VCs that reconstruct iss, vct, exp, nbf, status, or cnf from disclosures. These claims must be in the issuer-signed payload when present; selectively disclosed sub and iat remain valid.
  • Bound reference refresh-token retention by removing expired consumed ancestors after their successor retry deadline, while keeping a family index so revocation and cleanup do not scan the complete token table.
  • Validate every trusted JWK's public-only status, signature use, key operations, declared algorithm, key type and curve before verification. Explicit RSA, Edwards, and ES256K algorithm identifiers must match their key.
  • Limit decoded mdoc CBOR input to 256 KiB before parsing, and fail closed on invalid UTF-8 in resource indicators, Client ID Metadata identifiers, device verification URIs, and did:web identifiers.
  • Add a default cap of 16 presentations per OID4VP query, including queries permitting multiple credentials. Hosts can set a smaller positive max_presentations_per_query value when verifying a response.
  • Trust chains now default to at most ten statements and reject repeated entity identifiers as cycles.
  • Protect the ETS code, device-code, CIBA, and authorization-code replay-marker tables from writes by arbitrary co-resident processes; all mutations now run through their owning store processes.

Changed

  • Document the public verification-option families and their protocol-specific algorithm defaults. Internal option, record, store-contract, query-policy, and refresh-rotation paths now use shared validators without changing their accepted inputs or return values.
  • Treat omitted OID4VP multiple constraints as false, normalize Federation scope policy values for every entity type, and require multi-audience ID Tokens to carry a matching azp.
  • Make Trust Mark subject binding mandatory and add the configurable max_chain_length trust-chain verification option with a default of ten.
  • Normalize a pathless HTTPS DPoP target to / in both proof construction and verification, following RFC 3986 equivalence rules.
  • Widen CIBA's decision-time tolerance to 60 seconds for ordinary cross-node clock skew.

Fixed

  • Preserve the issuer authority when an appended endpoint path begins with a colon-bearing segment such as /org:tenant; URI resolution no longer mistakes that segment for a new scheme.
  • Detect a keystore whose active signing algorithm is absent from its published verification algorithms and report :signing_algorithm_not_published in rotation health.
  • Reject conflicting outer response_type and request_uri parameters when a signed authorization Request Object is present instead of silently ignoring them.
  • Check refresh-token expiry before client binding so expired grants do not disclose whether a supplied client identifier matches.
  • Implement CodeStore.ETS.mark_consumed/2 replay markers for bounded, unbounded, and no-refresh authorization-code outcomes so reuse detection also works with the reference store. The reference store also supports the capability-detected code-to-access-token linkage and revocation operations used by AttestoPhoenix 4.1, preserving authorization-code issuance when core is upgraded independently.

[2.5.0] - 2026-10-17

Security

  • Route core JWT verification through shared strict protected-header, trusted-candidate, and signature-verification paths. Protocol verifiers now apply consistent canonical parsing, critical-header handling, algorithm and key compatibility checks, malformed-result policy, and exact RSA-PSS parameter verification.
  • Validate untrusted verification candidates before expensive key conversion, support protocol-selected RSA minimum sizes, and let callers reject an ambiguous key selection whether the protected header includes kid or not.
  • Add one shared HTTPS identifier policy that rejects userinfo, fragments, hostless values, whitespace, control characters, and malformed percent escapes. HTTP remains available only through an explicit development opt-in.
  • Add an IANA-registry-based public destination policy for outbound fetches. It rejects non-global, scoped, multicast, documentation, benchmarking, and reserved IP addresses, checks embedded IPv4 in transition forms, and retains applicable globally reachable exceptions. Non-locator ORCHIDv2 and Drone Remote ID identifier prefixes remain blocked from network fetches.
  • Require HTTPS DPoP target URIs without userinfo when building proofs, while continuing to omit query and fragment components from the signed htu.

Added

Changed

  • Let Attesto.Plug.Authenticate resolve configuration through a function or MFA and accept a function or MFA token verifier. Custom verifiers must return a plain claims map and may preserve 403 insufficient-scope or 503 dependency outage semantics through tagged failures. Protected-resource metadata can now be resolved per request, with allow_http: true as an explicit development-only exception; RequireScopes carries the same option.
  • Let Attesto.ProtectedResourceMetadata.metadata/1 build metadata directly from options as well as from Attesto.Config, using the shared URI policy in either form. OAuth error challenges use the same per-request metadata and URI validation rules.
  • Make Attesto.Test.DPoP use the production proof builder while preserving its invalid-fixture helpers.

[2.4.0] - 2026-10-15

Security

  • Evaluate the complete OID4VP DCQL response policy, including credential-set and claim-set alternatives, requested disclosures, cardinality, permitted query IDs, and the explicit optional-response case. Empty or incomplete presentations can no longer complete a request that requires a credential.
  • Preserve refresh-token family replay evidence for as long as a live descendant can remain valid. Authorization-code redemption now passes the refresh-family deadline to CodeStore.mark_consumed/2 as :replay_retain_until so persistent stores can apply the same rule.
  • Fail closed for required key attestation, issuer pinning, malformed or weak embedded JWKs, invalid SD-JWT digest graphs, unsupported COSE critical headers, and malformed Federation policy or trust data before expensive key conversion.
  • Tighten assertion time ordering, nbf, Trust Mark header/time requirements, Request Object resource arrays, redirect handling, concrete-scope checks, DPoP thumbprints, resource indicators, and holder-key algorithm policy.
  • Apply FAPI algorithm and key compatibility to the Wallet Attestation cnf client-instance key by default as well as to the attestation signer. Only an explicit enforce_fapi_alg_policy: false accepts a non-FAPI instance key.

Added

  • Expose validated effective authorization_details on Attesto.AuthorizationRequest, including values supplied by a signed Request Object, so an authorization server can persist OID4VCI entitlements from the request it actually verified.
  • Carry validated RFC 8707 resource values through CIBA requests and grants so the authorization and token layers can enforce the requested audiences.
  • Add authorization-code replay-retention metadata for stores that keep a consumed marker after the code row itself expires.

Changed

  • Reject an explicitly empty dpop_jkt authorization-request parameter as invalid_request instead of treating it as absent.
  • Enforce the final OID4VP DCQL identifier grammar for credential and claim IDs: letters, digits, underscores, and hyphens only. Request construction now raises for IDs containing spaces, dots, slashes, or other characters.
  • Apply DCQL's multiple: false default to hand-built VP query constraints. Empty hand-built claims, vct_values, doctype_values, or claim values constraints now fail closed instead of silently becoming unconstrained.

Fixed

  • Normalize malformed PEM, mTLS distinguished-name, mdoc resolver, end-session, pre-authorized-code, and JWS decoding failures to documented error results instead of crashes or silently weakened constraints.
  • Keep revocation responses indistinguishable for unknown and foreign tokens, without allowing a foreign client to mutate the token family.
  • Correct IPv6 DPoP target URI construction, hostless HTTP resource rejection, prompt=none combinations, future step-up authentication times, and wildcard required-scope handling.

[2.3.1] - 2026-10-08

Security

  • Preserve the default FAPI algorithm and key-strength policy for every explicit allowlist, including mixed lists. Only enforce_fapi_alg_policy: false opts into a broader policy. Reject malformed, unknown, duplicate and non-string algorithm entries; an empty list continues to deny all algorithms.
  • Bind presentation responses to the requested credential-query IDs. Reject unsolicited IDs before credential processing, while retaining separate sets for permitted and required IDs.
  • Return controlled errors for malformed presentation values, including scalar values in encrypted presentation-session responses.

Version 2.3.0 was tagged but not published to Hex. This release includes its changes below; its tag remains unchanged.

[2.3.0] - 2026-10-08

Security

  • Treat explicitly empty signature algorithm allowlists as deny-all across public and composed verifiers. Low-level JWS verification retains its unrestricted trusted-key behavior only when the option is omitted.
  • Preserve FAPI key-strength checks when an explicit algorithm list narrows the default set. SD-JWT issuer verification now applies these checks by default, including PS256 RSA moduli of at least 2048 bits. Broader algorithm profiles remain explicit; enforce_fapi_alg_policy: false deliberately relaxes key restrictions and never changes empty-list rejection.
  • Verify PS256, PS384 and PS512 signatures with exact 32-, 48- and 64-byte PSS salt lengths and the corresponding MGF1 hash, independent of JOSE backend defaults. Reject otherwise valid signatures with different salt lengths.
  • Pin the same PSS parameters when the DPoP testing helper signs proofs, ensuring conforming signatures across native and fallback crypto backends.

Changed

  • Require non-empty presentation arrays per query ID in VpToken.verify/2 and presentation sessions, as required by final OID4VP. Scalar values require explicit legacy_scalar_values: true; array inputs retain list results.
  • Allow certificate-identified SD-JWT VC credentials to omit iss using issuer_identity: :certificate after the caller validates the issuer chain and supplies its verified leaf key. Existing issuer-claim requirements remain the default; a present malformed issuer still fails.

Added

  • Add an explicit RequestObject OID4VP profile that enforces request typing and client identity while ignoring iss, as required by OpenID4VP 1.0. Existing JAR issuer-binding behavior remains the default.
  • Add Attesto.JWE.encrypt/4 and decrypt/3 for bounded compact credential encryption using ECDH-ES with P-256 and A128GCM or A256GCM. Callers select algorithms from trusted protocol metadata and can narrow the accepted set.
  • Validate encoded sizes, canonical Base64URL, duplicate protected JSON members, ephemeral public keys, fixed GCM parameters, and key-use constraints before decryption. Reject compression and unsupported critical extensions; return controlled errors for malformed input and authentication failure.

[2.2.2] - 2026-10-04

Security

  • Bound compact JWS input and protected/signature segments before splitting or decoding, require canonical Base64URL, and reject duplicate JSON members at any nesting depth in signed headers and claim sets. Apply equivalent pre-decode bounds to did:jwk and mdoc credentials.
  • Add optional authorization-server issuer binding for refresh families. Rotation checks the issuer before any consume, retry, or reuse action; introspection treats mismatches as inactive and revocation treats them as an unknown token without mutating the family. Callers that omit the issuer keep the existing core behavior.
  • Bound private-key JWT jti values, compare credential/key-attestation nonces and cached refresh successors in constant time, and keep external signer failures from exposing backend errors or key material.
  • Document that attacker-controlled identifiers must not be used as telemetry metric labels because they permit unbounded series cardinality.

[2.2.1] - 2026-10-03

Changed

  • Update CIMD to draft 02: accept explicitly nonredirecting grant profiles and reject private or symmetric keys in public client JWKS documents.
  • Add optional absolute refresh-token family deadlines that remain fixed across rotation and grace retries, alongside the existing inactivity expiration.
  • Apply client-attestation draft 11 Challenge and JWT time-claim rules.
  • Preserve optional refresh-family attestation_jkt bindings through atomic rotation and grace retries; reject missing or changed instance keys.
  • Include the signing key ID in signed credential issuer metadata's public JWK.
  • Preserve required mdoc doctype metadata and accept its integer COSE signing algorithm identifiers, while retaining JOSE names for JWT credential formats.
  • Reject invalid mdoc validity ordering during issuance and verification: signed <= valid_from < valid_until.
  • Support OID4VCI 1.0 nested credential_metadata, preserving ordered claim paths, display properties, and JSON extensions. Validate current metadata while retaining legacy top-level inputs for 2.x callers.
  • Cite SD-JWT RFC 9901 and document the RFC 10017 and RFC 10027 host policies.

[2.1.0] - 2026-09-11

Changed

  • Document that Attesto.OpenIDDiscovery.metadata/2 normalizes Provider Metadata only. Authorization-server integrations must use the same effective OIDC scope catalog for registration and authorization policy so those surfaces cannot diverge from discovery.

[2.0.1] - 2026-09-02

Fixed

[2.0.0] - 2026-08-31

Breaking

  • Attesto.RefreshStore now requires one family-serialized rotate/4 transaction in place of the unsafe consume/2 then insert/1 then remember_successor/3 sequence. A winner returns {:ok, committed_parent, committed_child}; a loser returns the complete committed parent. The callback also distinguishes revoked, expired, retry-state-unavailable, random token-collision, invalid-rotation, and sibling-generation-integrity outcomes. get/1 must provide strong reads consistent with rotation and revocation. Custom stores must migrate before upgrading.
  • Attesto.DeviceCodeStore now requires get/1; lookup_user_code/1 returns the full entry; and the decision callbacks are approve/3 and deny/2, receive %{now: unix_seconds}, and return the committed post-transition entry. Decisions must atomically require a pending, unexpired code. Custom stores must update these callbacks.
  • Attesto.RefreshToken.issue/3 always starts a new family at generation zero. The former public :family_id and :generation continuation options are rejected; only the atomic rotation path can create descendants.
  • Authorization-code :family_id is provenance metadata rather than a refresh-family injection point. Hosts issuing a refresh token from a redeemed code should call Attesto.AuthorizationCode.issue_refresh_and_finalize/6, which owns issuance, requires the refresh context's subject and client to match the grant, permits only scope/resource subsets, and binds the exact returned family ID; the three-arity finalize/3 remains for flows that issue no refresh token and records a nil family marker. Under RFC 9449 §5, hosts classify clients and choose a nil refresh binding for confidential clients or a DPoP binding for public clients; a DPoP-bound grant accepts nil or its exact JKT and rejects a different one. Build the access/ID-token response before calling the composition API, and add its refresh token only after successful return.
  • Attesto.RefreshStore.insert/1 reports {:error, :conflict} for an existing token hash or family generation and must leave the candidate row absent. Successful rotate/4 calls return the exact committed parent and child snapshots, including the committed consumed_at and successor state; custom adapters must not substitute a racy post-commit read.
  • Device user codes now accept only lengths 8..64 (the default remains 8). The same bound applies to generation and normalization options, so custom verification pages should preserve the configured length when normalizing.
  • OID4VCI pre-authorized-code :authorized_scopes entries must now be valid OAuth scope tokens. Empty strings, whitespace, quotes, backslashes, control characters, and non-ASCII bytes are rejected as invalid attributes.
  • Authorization-code and refresh-token context claims, plus device-code and CIBA approval claims, must now be portable JSON objects: recursively string-keyed, valid UTF-8 without U+0000, proper arrays, and I-JSON exact-range integers only (-(2^53)+1 .. (2^53)-1). Floats, out-of-range integers, and other VM terms are rejected as :invalid_claims; composite nesting is capped at 64. This portable persisted-JSON subset lets JSON-backed stores preserve the canonical context without key conversion or value loss.
  • Explicit policy and lifetime options must now carry their documented type; omit an option to use its default instead of passing nil. This applies to client-assertion :enforce_fapi_alg_policy / :max_lifetime, wallet attestation :enforce_fapi_alg_policy / :max_age_seconds, authorization request :require_nonce / :require_pkce, key attestation :require_exp / :enforce_fapi_alg_policy, CIBA request policy and length options, and CIBA issuance :expires_in / :max_expires_in / :interval. Introspection's :authorize option must be a one-argument function or nil.

Adapter migration

  • Before upgrading a custom store, audit every callback against the Attesto 2 contracts. RefreshStore requires family-serialized rotate/4 and strong get/1 reads; DeviceCodeStore requires full-record get/1 and lookup_user_code/1; and CodeStore, PreAuthorizedCodeStore, CIBAStore, and PresentationSessionStore now reject unexpected callback returns and malformed records with constant contract errors. Return the documented tuples, maps, and atoms exactly, preserve the required record bindings, and keep state transitions atomic before deploying a custom adapter.
  • Persisted-claims upgrade note: Attesto 1.x accepted arbitrary maps for authorization-code and refresh-token context claims and device/CIBA approval claims. Attesto 2 requires the exact portable JSON subset described above. Before a rolling upgrade, quiesce every 1.x writer or otherwise prevent it from creating records with atom keys, floats, out-of-range integers, invalid strings, or other VM terms. Audit records as they are returned by the adapter: a nonportable authorization code is atomically removed by CodeStore.take/1 before validation; a nonportable refresh record fails closed and may revoke its family when its identity is trustworthy; and an approved device/CIBA record is rejected before consumption. Migrate only with an explicit collision/precision policy; otherwise expire and reissue those records. Records already returned as canonical portable JSON continue to work.

Security

  • Refresh rotation now commits the parent transition, protected retry state, and exact child in one atomic operation serialized against family revocation. Simultaneous matching requests coalesce on one successor instead of observing partial state. A pre-commit protection failure or documented :invalid_rotation rollback leaves the parent usable and returns :temporarily_unavailable without revocation; an ambiguous callback failure or corrupt committed state attempts family revocation. Every path emits a distinct [:attesto, :refresh_token, :rotation_state_failed] event instead of reporting success or falsely alleging token reuse. A callback that raises, throws, or exits gets the same sanitized event and cleanup attempt before its original failure is propagated unchanged.
  • Rotation grace must be a non-negative integer and is fixed when the successor is issued via a stored retry_until deadline. Clock rollback, malformed recovery state, a missing successor, and an expired successor can no longer return a cached refresh credential. The ETS reference store redacts retry credentials after their deadline; strict zero-grace rotation stores only an exact non-secret tombstone, and revoked-family markers are retained for the store lifetime rather than expiring after a fixed 30-day interval. A consumed parent's own expiry is also authoritative, so retained rows and later grace configuration cannot extend successor recovery beyond that boundary. A backward clock difference between serving nodes, no larger than the configured grace, is tolerated during that fixed retry window; larger rollback remains fail-closed. Generation lookup is constant-time, and a pre-existing sibling generation atomically revokes the corrupt family. An expired ancestor remains a valid family-revocation handle when the caller is authorized, so live descendants cannot survive revocation.
  • Client-binding and sender-constraint opt-outs now require exact booleans. Malformed :allow_missing_client_id? and :require_confirmation_binding values can no longer disable their checks; omitted means the secure default and explicit nil is not an opt-out.
  • Unexpected replay-, nonce-, and refresh-store callback returns now fail loudly, including a refused successor-persistence callback that older code could ignore. Constant contract errors no longer copy adapter return data into exception messages or telemetry.
  • Persisted Refresh, CIBA, device-code, and authorization-code contexts now reject unexpected sibling keys at validation; host-specific values remain inside the documented string-keyed JSON :claims object.
  • Refresh-reuse telemetry is emitted even when family revocation raises, throws, exits, or violates its return contract. The event carries only a bounded cleanup status, and the original cleanup failure is preserved.
  • Refresh-token introspection keeps RFC 7662's indistinguishable inactive response when its store violates the callback contract, raises, throws, or exits, while emitting the sanitized [:attesto, :introspection, :refresh_store_failed] operational event.
  • Refresh-rotation lookup exceptions and malformed records now emit the sanitized rotation_state_failed event with operation: :lookup; when the presented hash and family ID are still trustworthy, the family is revoked before the constant contract error is returned or the original callback failure is re-raised.
  • Presentation-session store results are now validated before use, including the consuming result read. Unexpected callback returns and malformed records fail loudly with constant errors instead of becoming ordinary missing-state outcomes. Authorization-code reads and consumption, device/CIBA state transitions, and OID4VCI pre-authorized-code redemption enforce their documented store contracts the same way. Consumed records must match the requested code identity and preserve the security context validated immediately before the atomic transition; a malformed or changed record can no longer construct a grant.
  • Device and CIBA approvals cannot widen the originally requested scope; persisted decisions must retain their subject and required authentication context. CIBA propagates the approved acr and auth_time into its grant; a one-second approval/redeemer clock difference is tolerated, while larger future timestamps and impossible persisted records remain rejected before grant construction.
  • Authorization-code, OID4VCI pre-authorized-code, refresh-token, device-code, and CIBA clock/lifetime options are validated before any destructive store transition, so malformed host input cannot burn an otherwise valid one-time grant.

Fixed

  • Accept the optional JWT and oauth-authz-req+jwt media types on signed CIBA authentication requests case-insensitively, including their application/-prefixed forms, while continuing to reject unrelated explicit types. This restores interoperability with the FAPI-CIBA two-client flow.

[1.15.0] - 2026-08-13

Added

  • RFC 8705 §2 client-certificate authentication primitives for both tls_client_auth (all five registered DN/SAN identity forms) and self_signed_tls_client_auth (exact registered x5c leaf matching).
  • Attesto.Signer, an additive JWS signing contract for HSM/KMS/enclave keys whose private material cannot be exported. Existing PEM keystores retain the same path; token, ID Token, JARM, signed introspection, JWT VC, SD-JWT, and signed credential-metadata issuance can use a non-extractable signer.
  • Attesto.Keystore.rotation_health/2 and optional verification_key_metadata/0 expiry metadata. Health reports whether the current signing key is published, whether an overlap window is active, and whether verification keys are expired or approaching expiry.

Security

  • External-signer output is verified locally against the advertised public JWK and selected algorithm before a compact JWS is returned, catching wrong KMS keys, message/digest mode mistakes, non-JOSE signature encodings, and RSA-PSS signatures whose salt length is not the JOSE hash-output length.
  • An external signer's trusted public JWK alg member now participates in signing-algorithm selection ahead of key-type inference; an RSA signer advertising PS256 cannot silently receive an RS256 operation.
  • RFC 8705 certificate parsing is bounded to 1 MiB and registered identity values to 4 KiB. Email SAN comparison preserves the potentially case-sensitive local part while normalizing only the domain.
  • Keystore callback contracts are validated when Attesto.Config is built: an extractable keystore must export signing_pem/0, while an external signer must export both signing_jwk/0 and sign/2. Misspelled or partial callback implementations no longer wait until the first mint to fail.
  • Rotation health rejects malformed expiry metadata, marks metadata for an unknown kid invalid, and distinguishes an expired active signing key (:expired_signing_key, invalid) from an expired overlap key (warning).

[1.14.0] - 2026-08-12

SIOPv2 DID Subject Syntax support for connection-free DID methods. Self-issued ID Tokens can now bind their subject and signature directly to a did:jwk or did:key verification method without an issuer JWKS or network resolution.

Added

  • Attesto.Siop.verify/2 now supports SIOPv2 Decentralized Identifier Subject Syntax for connection-free did:jwk and did:key subjects. Verification requires the method-defined protected kid, rejects a simultaneous sub_jwk, resolves the holder public key locally, enforces the JWK's signature usage and algorithm metadata, verifies the signature, and requires iss == sub. Network-backed and unsupported DID methods continue to fail closed.

[1.13.0] - 2026-08-11

Hardening of the ID-JAG (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer) assertion verifier. Pairs with attesto_phoenix 2.12.0, which enforces the signed resource and cnf.jkt constraints at the token endpoint; that package now requires this release (>= 1.13.0).

Security

  • ID-JAG verification now validates a present scope, resource, and cnf instead of allowing a malformed optional authorization constraint to be treated as absent. A signed constraint that could not be parsed previously degraded to "absent", erasing the IdP's ceiling; it now fails closed. An empty scope is rejected rather than read as an unbounded one.
  • Mixed confirmation methods are rejected. A cnf carrying jkt alongside any other member (for example an x5t#S256 certificate thumbprint) previously matched on jkt alone, silently dropping the second constraint — an IdP that required both DPoP and mTLS possession got an assertion enforced as DPoP-only. Only a single-member cnf.jkt is accepted.
  • jti is bounded (256 bytes) before it can reach a host replay store, so unbounded IdP-controlled input never becomes a store key.

Changed

  • Potentially breaking: an ID-JAG carrying authorization_details (RFC 9396) is now rejected with :invalid_claims. This verifier has no policy engine for their typed constraints, and ignoring a signed constraint would silently promote a narrowly-scoped assertion to broader scope-only authority. Fail closed until the constraints can be enforced end to end. Trusted IdPs that mint ID-JAGs including authorization_details must stop doing so, or pin attesto ~> 1.12.2 until they can.
  • An RFC 7800 confirmation claim using a method other than DPoP jkt is likewise rejected rather than treated as an unbound (bearer) assertion.

[1.12.2] - 2026-08-11

Second-round hardening from a review-of-the-fixes pass, a dedicated sweep of the shared crypto/infra primitives (never a prior review front), and fuzzing of the SD-JWT / mdoc / status-list parsers. mdoc and status-list parsing came through fuzzing fully clean.

Security

  • Attesto.Did did:jwk DoS: resolve/2 now rejects an oversized presenter-controlled RSA key on the raw map (via SigningAlg.rsa_params_ok?) BEFORE JOSE.JWK.from_map/1 bignum-decodes it — a ~256 KB modulus previously pinned a scheduler for ~3s per unauthenticated request. (did:jwk resolution is not yet wired to an HTTP endpoint, so this was latent.)
  • Attesto.SdJwtVc.issue/2 registered-claim integrity: subject claims are string-keyed before merging the registered claims, so an atom-keyed collision (e.g. claims: %{cnf: ...}) can no longer emit a duplicate JSON member and let a last-wins verifier bind to the wrong holder key. Matches Attesto.JwtVc.

Fixed

  • Attesto.SdJwt.verify/3 and Attesto.CredentialProof.verify_jwt/2 now fail closed ({:error, _}) on a malformed host-supplied jwks / accepted_algs (nil, non-list) instead of raising, honoring their documented contract (found by fuzzing).
  • The internal ETS store's :direct reset now clears every table the store owns, not just the primary — a store adding extra_tables: on the default reset mode would previously leave those rows intact.

Documentation

  • Attesto.Did did:web resolver: explicit SSRF warning (the fetch URL is presenter-controlled — allow-list before dereferencing).
  • Attesto.Mdoc: clarified that document-type binding requires :expected_doc_type (threaded via Attesto.VpToken's :query_constraints).

[1.12.1] - 2026-08-10

Fixed

  • Attesto.PreAuthorizedCodeStore.ETS.reset/0 (test-facing) now routes through the owner process (reset: :server), so it works on the :protected table introduced in 1.12.0. In 1.12.0 the macro-provided direct :ets.delete_all_objects/1 raised insufficient access rights when a downstream test suite called reset/0. Production is unaffected (reset is test-only).

[1.12.0] - 2026-08-10

Wallet-surface security-hardening release from a 6-front adversarial sweep of the EU-wallet code (SD-JWT/SD-JWT VC, mdoc/COSE, OID4VP verifier, OID4VCI issuer, OpenID Federation/DID/SIOPv2/attestation) plus an ecosystem-CVE and per-spec security-considerations cross-check. The cryptographic surface was found solid; the fixes close policy-enforcement gaps.

Security

  • Status List Token freshness: Attesto.StatusList.verify/3 now rejects an expired token (exp present and past, 60s clock-skew leeway). exp remains optional per draft-ietf-oauth-status-list §11.5, so a no-exp token does not expire. Previously a stale/expired list verified indefinitely, letting a revoked credential read VALID.
  • SD-JWT VC registered claims: Attesto.SdJwtVc.issue/2 never makes registered claims (iss/vct/cnf/status/iat/exp/nbf/sub) selectively disclosable, closing a holder-binding / revocation-reference strip where a holder could remove cnf and present as a bearer credential.
  • SD-JWT disclosure DoS: Attesto.SdJwt caps presentation byte-length and disclosure count before any base64/JSON decode work.
  • Pre-authorized code store isolation: the reference ETS store now uses a :protected table (owner-only writes, single-use take preserved), matching the credential-offer store, so a co-resident BEAM process cannot forge a redeemable grant.
  • OpenID Federation trust marks: added Attesto.Federation.TrustMark.verify/3 for real signature/iss/sub/typ/exp verification; validate_trust_marks/1 is documented as structural-only.

Fixed

[1.11.0] - 2026-08-10

Second security-hardening release, from two further adversarial audit rounds (under-covered flows + implementation-level classes) and three cross-model code reviews. Focused on denial-of-service resource-exhaustion classes and OID4VP verification correctness.

Security

  • RSA verification-key parameter bounds (DoS). Attesto.SigningAlg.rsa_params_ok?/1 rejects an RSA verification key whose modulus exceeds 8192 bits or whose public exponent is not an odd integer in 3..65537, evaluated on the RAW base64url n/e before any bignum decode. Without it, an attacker-supplied key with a multi-hundred-KB exponent pins a scheduler in modexp for seconds. Wired at every gate that admits an untrusted key: Attesto.Key.verification_jwk/2, the internal JWS candidate selector (via map_candidate!), the SD-JWT holder Key Binding path (Attesto.SdJwt), and Attesto.JwtVc's cnf parse.
  • OID4VP format binding + query-ID requirement. Attesto.VpToken.verify/2 now (a) binds each presentation to the DCQL-requested format — a validly signed dc+sd-jwt credential can no longer satisfy an mso_mdoc query (:format_mismatch) — and (b) treats every query id that carries a constraint as required, so a wallet cannot return a credential under a different id to dodge the type/claim binding. constraints_from_dcql/1 accepts atom- or string-keyed queries. (Completes the DCQL binding introduced in 1.10.0.)
  • Token Status List decompression-bomb bound. Attesto.StatusList inflates the status bitstring through a capped :zlib.safeInflate loop (16 MiB ceiling, :status_list_too_large) instead of :zlib.uncompress/1, so a signed zlib bomb from a compromised status issuer cannot expand to gigabytes.
  • CBOR/mdoc parse-amplification bound. Attesto.Mdoc and Attesto.Cose reject CBOR input over 1 MiB before decoding, bounding the deep-nesting amplification the decoder would otherwise turn into heap ahead of any signature check.
  • Nonce single-use + store ceilings. Attesto.CNonceStore gains a required atomic consume/1 (single-use OID4VCI c_nonces; see attesto_phoenix). The Attesto.CNonceStore.ETS and Attesto.DPoP.NonceStore.ETS stores bound table growth from their unauthenticated endpoints with an O(1) best-effort ceiling.

Changed (breaking)

  • Attesto.CNonceStore requires the consume/1 callback. The bundled ETS store implements it; custom stores must add it (a store that cannot single-use a nonce must not be used for issuance).
  • Attesto.VpToken.verify/2: a query id present in :query_constraints is now required in the response even if absent from :expected_query_ids.

[1.10.0] - 2026-08-10

Security-hardening release from an adversarial audit against four public vulnerability classes (broken tenant/authorization isolation, alg:none / decrypt-then-verify signature bypass, DPoP session theft, and unbounded-batch DoS). The audit found the JWT-verification and DPoP surfaces already fail-closed; the fixes below close authorization-isolation seams and add defense-in-depth.

Security

  • Credential-offer id is now generated by the library. Attesto.CredentialOffer.store_by_reference/3 mints the by-reference offer id with a 256-bit CSPRNG (Attesto.Secret.generate/0) and stores it, so a host can no longer supply a guessable id. The by-reference offer endpoint is unauthenticated and a pre-authorized offer embeds a redeemable pre-authorized_code, so a weak id let an attacker enumerate the endpoint and redeem a victim's code. Use this instead of calling the store's put/1 with a self-chosen id. :ttl is validated (a positive integer <= 3600 s).
  • OID4VP verified results are single-use. Attesto.PresentationSession.result/2 now reads the completed result through the store's take/1 and clears it, and the reference store's get/1 no longer returns the result payload at all. The OID4VP response_code handed to the browser is the session id and transits the address bar, history, Referer, and logs; reading results once means a captured response_code can no longer be replayed to re-read the presented claims.
  • Credential Request proofs are bounded. Attesto.CredentialRequest.parse/2 caps the total proofs per request (default 50, override with :max_proofs; validated to a non-negative integer) and rejects an over-cap request with {:error, :too_many_proofs} before any signature is verified, closing an authenticated proof-verification amplification-DoS.
  • Key-attestation signer strength parity. Attesto.KeyAttestation.verify/2 now applies the FAPI RSA-modulus / Edwards-curve strength policy to the attestation signer (via :enforce_fapi_alg_policy), matching Attesto.ClientAssertion and Attesto.WalletAttestation.
  • Reference stores hardened to :protected ETS. The presentation-session and credential-offer ETS tables (which hold plaintext session data / redeemable codes) drop :public, so a co-resident BEAM process can no longer directly :ets.insert/2 to overwrite a verified result, bypass the atomic pending -> completed guard, or inject a forged offer.
  • Introspection multi-tenant guidance. Documented that any deployment where more than one client can authenticate to introspection MUST set :introspection_authorize (without it, one client can introspect another's token). No behavior change.

Changed (breaking)

  • Attesto.PresentationSession.result/2 is now single-use: it consumes the completed session, and a second read (or a read of a still-pending/expired session) returns :error. Hosts that read the result more than once must read it once and cache their own outcome.
  • Attesto.PresentationSessionStore requires the take/1 callback (moved out of @optional_callbacks), and get/1 MUST NOT return a completed session's data.result. Custom store implementations must provide take/1; the bundled Attesto.PresentationSessionStore.ETS is unaffected.

[1.9.0] - 2026-08-05

Added

  • A third redirect-URI matching mode, :exact_allow_loopback_port_including_localhost, which applies the RFC 8252 §7.3 port allowance to the bare hostname localhost as well as the 127.0.0.1 / [::1] literals.

    Native clients exist that register a portless http://localhost/callback in their client-id metadata document and then bind an ephemeral port. Under :exact_allow_loopback_port every such request fails redirect_uri_not_registered: exact comparison fails on the port, and the §7.3 exception does not cover the name. Claude Code is one such client, so no Attesto deployment could serve it over the loopback flow.

    The literal-IP-only reading remains correct and remains the behavior of :exact_allow_loopback_port — §7.3's MUST is scoped to "loopback IP redirect URIs", and 1.4.1's reconciliation of RFC 9700's wider wording still stands. What this adds is the observation that nothing forbids a server allowing the name, and that §8.3's case against localhost is stated entirely in terms of what the client does (which interface it binds, its firewall, its host-name resolution) — none of which a server changes by refusing the request. The residual risk is the combination of two allowances the module already makes separately: a registered localhost URI is already reachable by exact match, and §7.3 port flexibility is already mandated for the IP literals. Permitting only that combination is why this is a separate opt-in rather than a change to the existing mode.

    No behavior change unless selected. :exact and :exact_allow_loopback_port are byte-for-byte as before — localhost still gets no port flexibility under either, and the existing test asserting that is unchanged. localhost is a distinct host identity from the IP literals and never cross-matches them, and every other constraint is preserved: byte-exact http:// scheme, anchored authority (localhost.evil.example, sub.localhost, evil-localhost, localhost. and userinfo all stay outside), no fragment, exact path and query, and the asymmetric request / registered port rule.

    Thanks to @jtippett for the contribution in #20.

[1.8.1] - 2026-08-03

Fixed

  • Clean compile for consumers without the optional :cbor dependency. Attesto.VpToken's mdoc verification path pattern-matched on Attesto.Mdoc, which compiles to a raising stub when :cbor is absent. Under Elixir 1.19+'s set-theoretic type checker the stub types as none(), so those clauses were reported as unreachable — a warning that surfaced for any downstream app (e.g. a Livebook Mix.install) that didn't pull :cbor. The mdoc verification cluster is now gated behind Code.ensure_loaded?(CBOR): with :cbor present the behavior is unchanged; without it, an mdoc presentation fails closed with {:error, {id, :mdoc_unsupported}} and SD-JWT VC / jwt_vc_json verification is unaffected. A dedicated CI job now compiles the library with no optional deps present and fails on any such warning.

[1.8.0] - 2026-08-03

Added

  • OpenID for Verifiable Credentials (OID4VC / EU digital identity) — the conn-free core of the issuer and verifier roles, targeting the HAIP profile. Issue and verify IETF SD-JWT VC (Attesto.SdJwt / Attesto.SdJwtVc), ISO 18013-5 mdoc (Attesto.Mdoc, CBOR + COSE_Sign1), and W3C jwt_vc_json (Attesto.JwtVc), all with holder key binding. OID4VCI issuance primitives (Attesto.CredentialOffer, CredentialRequest, CredentialResponse, CredentialProof, CredentialIssuerMetadata, WalletAttestation, KeyAttestation) and OID4VP presentation primitives (Attesto.PresentationRequest, VpToken, PresentationSession + store) including DCQL, direct_post / encrypted direct_post.jwt with a per-request ephemeral response-encryption key, and the x509 client_id schemes. Plus Attesto.StatusList (IETF Token Status List), Attesto.Siop (SIOPv2 Self-Issued ID Token verification for the RP role, with sub_jwk self-signature, RFC 7638 subject binding, and fail-closed nonce/exp/iat/nbf checks), and OpenID Federation support.
  • Signed Credential Issuer Metadata (CredentialIssuerMetadata.signed/2), the x5c header and dc+sd-jwt typ for SD-JWT VC issuance, and the response- encryption-key binding threaded into mdoc direct_post.jwt verification — the interoperability details exercised while driving the OIDF OID4VCI/OID4VP conformance suites green.

[1.7.0] - 2026-08-02

Security

  • DPoP replay identities are now namespaced by the proof key. jti uniqueness is only guaranteed per key (RFC 9449 §4.2), so recording the raw jti let two keys sharing a jti collide in the replay store — a cross-client false replay and a targeted DoS in which an authenticated attacker pre-burns a victim's jti under the attacker's own key. Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 now returns replay_key, a fixed-length digest of jkt:jti, and every replay path (the plug, the token endpoint, PAR, device authorization) records THAT.

    Upgrade note: the recorded identity's format changed (raw jti → digest). During a rolling upgrade, old and new nodes write different formats to a shared replay store, so a single proof could be accepted once on each side within its acceptance window (max_age + skew, default ~120s). Drain old nodes and wait out one proof lifetime, or briefly stop the world, to close that window. A fresh deployment is unaffected.

  • A batch of fail-closed / correctness fixes found by a full-surface adversarial sweep and two rounds of external review:

    • Attesto.DPoP replay TTL now retains the jti one second past the inclusive freshness boundary, closing a sub-second edge-of-life replay gap.
    • Attesto.IdentityAssertion rejects a present non-integer nbf instead of treating it as absent (:invalid_claims).
    • Attesto.RequestObject parameter coercion is total: a request-object claim that is a list with a non-string member is dropped rather than raising.
    • CIBA signed authentication requests reject an authorization-endpoint request object (typ: oauth-authz-req+jwt); typ comparison follows RFC 7515 §4.1.9 for the application/ prefix.
    • Attesto.JARM reserved claims (iss/aud/iat/exp) can no longer be shadowed by a caller's atom- or charlist-keyed duplicate.
    • Attesto.SessionState rejects an OP browser-state secret under 32 bytes and a session_state salt containing a space or ., and serializes the browser origin closer to the WHATWG form (lowercase scheme/host, bracketed IPv6).

Changed

  • The :replay_check callback and verify_proof/2's replay_key carry an OPAQUE replay identity (a digest), not the raw jti; do not parse it. The [:attesto, :dpop, :replay_detected] telemetry still carries the raw client jti for correlation.

  • Attesto.Scope.grants_all?/3 is now linear in the requested-scope count. It previously rescanned the granted set and re-split resource wildcards for every (required, granted) pair, so a large caller-supplied scope value - on which RFC 6749 §3.3 places no bound - was a denial-of-service lever: 500,000 scope tokens took ~20 seconds. Classifying the granted set once and testing each required scope against that index in O(1) drops the same input to ~40ms. For every proper-list input (the typespec's contract) the result is identical to the naive form, pinned by a generated property test; an improper list now raises rather than short-circuiting, a louder failure on a value the contract already forbids. Surfaced by mining the class behind Keycloak CVE-2026-4634.

[1.6.0] - 2026-08-01

Security

  • Claim a DPoP proof's jti only after the access token has verified. Attesto.Plug.Authenticate ran :replay_check during proof validation, two steps before verify_token. That callback is check-AND-record — the default claims the identifier with :ets.insert_new/2 in the same step that tests it — so an unauthenticated caller wrote a row on every request. A DPoP proof is signed by a key the caller generated, so anyone can mint a valid one, pair it with any string in the Authorization header, and grow an unbounded ETS table for the cost of a signature.

    The guarantee is unchanged: the claim still happens before the request is served, it is still the same atomic check-and-record, and a replayed jti on an otherwise-valid request is still refused (RFC 9449 §11.1).

    The authorization-server path needed the same fix, in attesto_phoenix — an earlier draft of this entry claimed it did not, on the grounds that %Request{} carries an authenticated client. That is false for a public client (RFC 6749 §2.1), which presents a client_id and no credential, so the same unauthenticated write was reachable at the token endpoint. See that package's changelog.

  • Attesto.SecureCompare.equal?/2 no longer short-circuits on a length mismatch. Both operands are hashed to 32 bytes and those digests are compared, so the comparison no longer separates "wrong length" from "right length, wrong bytes" — the distinction an attacker probes with. A matching pair does one extra byte comparison to rule out a digest collision; that branch separates right from wrong, which the answer already reveals.

    Attesto.PKCE.verify/3 was never exposed - it gates on Attesto.Thumbprint.valid?/1, which requires an exact byte size - but Attesto.DPoP's ath comparison takes an arbitrary-length value straight from the presented proof, so it was, and it is the caller this most benefits.

    Note what the change does and does not buy: the comparison no longer reveals HOW the operands differ, but hashing reads every byte, so its duration still depends on their total size.

Added

  • Attesto.Telemetry — :telemetry events for the refusals that mean someone holds a credential they should not:

    EventFires when
    [:attesto, :refresh_token, :reuse_detected]a rotated token is presented again; the family has been revoked
    [:attesto, :dpop, :replay_detected]a proof carries an already-recorded jti
    [:attesto, :token, :sender_constraint_mismatch]a sender-bound token is presented with the wrong proof of possession

    Previously these returned an atom and nothing else, so a host that wanted to alert had to wrap every call site. Metadata carries correlation handles (family_id, client_id, subject, jti, binding, reason). No credential or digest of one is ever copied into an event, but some handles are read out of credentials - jti from the proof, client_id from the token - and jti is the client's to choose, so a handler should treat metadata as untrusted input. The events are indicators to correlate, not proof of theft. Ordinary failures — expired, unknown client, wrong scope — are deliberately not events. Event names and metadata keys are public API; see the module docs.

    Adds :telemetry as a dependency.

  • Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 now reports the replay_ttl it derived, so a caller claiming the jti itself uses that verification's own acceptance window rather than re-deriving the formula.

Documentation

  • Attesto.DPoP.ReplayCache now names AttestoPhoenix.Store.EctoReplayCheck as the shared-store implementation to use on a multi-node deployment. It previously described one in the abstract ("e.g. a Postgres-backed cache"), which read as an instruction to go and build something the family already ships.

[1.5.0] - 2026-07-28

Security

  • Reject a Client ID Metadata Document whose redirect_uris contain a URI that RFC 3986 and the WHATWG URL Standard read differently ({:error, :invalid_redirect_uris}).

    A CIMD document is fetched from a URL the client itself chose, so its redirect_uris are supplied by the client in a way a host-registered set is not. Elixir's URI follows RFC 3986 while the browser that receives the Location follows WHATWG, and the two disagree about some authorities: in https://evil.example\@client.example/cb, RFC 3986 reads evil.example\ as userinfo and client.example as the host, while WHATWG treats the backslash as a path separator and navigates to evil.example.

    Any check phrased in terms of a host or an origin — the CIMD draft's same-origin tightening, a deployment's origin allow-list — is decided with the first parser and enforced by the second, so such a URI could pass the check and still send the authorization response off-origin. Refusing the document keeps the URI out of the registered set those checks ever run against.

    Byte-exact matching (RFC 6749 §3.1.2.3) was never affected: it compares strings, not origins. The RFC 8252 §7.3 loopback exception was never affected either, because it anchors on the whole authority rather than the parsed host — http://evil.example\@127.0.0.1/cb was already refused.

Added

  • Attesto.RedirectURI.unambiguous?/1, the predicate behind the above: whether every URL parser agrees which origin a URI names. It refuses backslashes, userinfo, and C0 controls/whitespace anywhere in the URI. Exposed so a host applying its own origin-level policy to a redirect URI can gate on the same rule.

    This governs what may be registered; it is not a matching mode and does not change what registered?/3 accepts.

Changed

  • The WHATWG parity suite now pins a second invariant alongside the loopback one: for every URI unambiguous?/1 admits, the host RFC 3986 reads and the host WHATWG reads are the same string.

[1.4.1] - 2026-07-28

Documentation

  • Reconcile RFC 9700's wording of the loopback exception with the rule Attesto.RedirectURI actually implements. RFC 9700 §2.1 and §4.1.3 phrase it as applying to "localhost redirection URIs of native apps", which reads wider than this module's literal-IP-only rule and could be mistaken for a conformance gap. Both texts define the exception by reference — "as described in Section 7.3 of [RFC8252]" — and §7.3 constructs the URI from the loopback IP literal, not the name, so localhost there is shorthand for "the loopback interface" and §7.3's construction is the normative content.

    No behavior change: 1.4.0 already implements exactly this. A localhost redirect URI still matches exactly; it just gets no port flexibility.

  • State in the README's RFC table where the §7.3 opt-in lives — the core defaults to exact RFC 6749 §3.1.2.3 matching and the caller selects :exact_allow_loopback_port per request — rather than the vaguer "opt-in, off by default".

[1.4.0] - 2026-07-28

Added

  • RFC 8252 §7.3 loopback interface redirection, as an opt-in redirect-URI matching mode. Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 accepts :redirect_uri_matching, which is :exact (the RFC 6749 §3.1.2.3 simple string comparison) unless a host selects :exact_allow_loopback_port. Under the exception a native app's loopback redirect URI matches on any port, so an ephemeral port bound at runtime need not be registered ahead of time, while scheme, host, path, and query still compare exactly. The relaxation is scoped to http://127.0.0.1/... and http://[::1]/...; RFC 8252 §8.3 makes http://localhost/... unacceptable, and https, private-use schemes, and every remote host stay exact-match. An unmatched redirect URI is still classified {:direct, :redirect_uri_not_registered} and is never used as a redirect target. The new matching logic lives in Attesto.RedirectURI.

    The two sides of the comparison differ in one respect: a port on the request URI must be decimal 1..65535 or absent, since it names an endpoint a browser is about to be redirected to, while the registered URI's port is discarded and so may be anything — including the conventional :0 placeholder.

    Defaults are unchanged: without the option, redirect matching is byte-identical to previous releases. Enabling the exception is incompatible with profiles that mandate exact redirect-URI matching, so it must be a deliberate deployment decision. Redemption-time redirect_uri comparison in Attesto.AuthorizationCode is unaffected — the code is bound to the URI the client actually presented, ephemeral port included, and still matches exactly.

[1.3.0] - 2026-07-25

Changed

  • Admit compatible JOSE releases through the 1.x line while retaining 1.11.12 as the minimum security- and runtime-compatible version. This lets hosts use newer native cryptographic adapters without another Attesto release.

Fixed

  • Derive OIDC at_hash and c_hash claims for Ed25519-signed ID Tokens with SHA-512 and Ed448-signed ID Tokens with SHAKE256, matching their signature primitives and interoperable OIDC validators. Previously EdDSA used SHA-256 unconditionally, contrary to OIDC's generic hash rule when applied to RFC
    1. ID Token and logout-token minting now snapshot the signing PEM once so algorithm, curve-specific hash, kid, and signature cannot straddle a keystore rotation. Algorithm selection remains bound to trusted keystore metadata and key material; Ed448 uses JOSE's configured Curve448 and SHA3 backends. The ambiguous keyless hash_alg/1 and hash_half_bytes/1 helpers remain Ed25519-compatible but are deprecated in favor of key-aware oidc_hash_profile/2 and oidc_hash/3. A missing SHAKE256 backend now raises a direct configuration error.
  • Support RFC 9864's exact Ed25519 and Ed448 JOSE identifiers in trusted key metadata, signing, verification, ID Token hash profiles, and DPoP while retaining legacy EdDSA inference for wire compatibility. DPoP discovery advertises the new identifiers only when the configured JOSE backend reports them available. Default FAPI client-assertion, signed-request-object, and CIBA policies accept EdDSA only over a trusted Ed25519 key and accept exact Ed25519, never Ed448, and require PS256 RSA moduli to be at least 2048 bits; an explicit non-FAPI allowlist can opt into Ed448 or a weaker RSA key, while named FAPI policies retain the key gate when their algorithm list is narrowed. DPoP rejects RSA proof keys with moduli below 2048 bits for every accepted RSASSA and RSA-PSS proof algorithm. FAPI server keystores must also provision RSA keys of at least 2048 bits; generic keystore resolution remains profile-neutral for backward compatibility.

Documentation

  • Correct the token, ID Token, logout-token, and keystore documentation to describe Attesto's existing multi-algorithm support. Signing and verification bind RS256, PS256, ES256, ES384, ES512, legacy EdDSA, Ed25519, or Ed448 to trusted keystore metadata or the key type and curve; verification never learns algorithm policy from a presented JWS header.

[1.2.5] - 2026-07-17

Fixed

  • Require JOSE 1.11.12 or later on the 1.11 release line. JOSE 1.11.9 and 1.11.10 cannot encode or decode EC private keys on OTP 28 after OTP changed the ECPrivateKey version representation. JOSE 1.11.11 fixed EC handling but introduced a builtin-JSON regression that encoded Elixir nil as the string "nil"; 1.11.12 is the first release to include both fixes. Attesto's public API and runtime policy are unchanged.

[1.2.4] - 2026-07-16

Security

  • Require JOSE 1.11.9 or later on the 1.11 release line. This excludes releases affected by the PBES2 iteration-count denial of service and avoids the unintended runtime Dialyxir dependency published in JOSE 1.11.7 and 1.11.8.

[1.2.3] - 2026-07-16

Security

  • Constrain the optional Plug dependency to advisory-safe patch lines while retaining compatibility across Plug 1.16 through 1.20. This prevents package resolution from selecting affected releases between otherwise-safe lower and upper bounds; Attesto's runtime behavior is unchanged.

[1.2.2] - 2026-07-16

Fixed

  • Token verification, RFC 7662 introspection, and protected-resource Plug authentication can now validate access tokens against an explicit, trusted set of RFC 8707 resource audiences without disabling audience checks. The Plug policy is configured per protected resource. Scalar audiences must occur in the configured set; every member of an array audience must be trusted. The default verifier behavior remains unchanged when no trusted set is supplied, and malformed policy fails closed.

Security

  • Raise the optional Plug dependency floor to 1.19.5, excluding releases with published multipart temp-file exhaustion, nested-parameter quadratic-time denial-of-service, and cookie attribute-injection advisories.

[1.2.1] - 2026-07-08

Fixed

  • Attesto.Keystore.Static now labels the signing key's own kid with the configured :signing_alg, so a keystore that signs PS256 (or any alg other than the one inferred from the key type) with a single key no longer needs a redundant :key_algs entry to verify its own tokens. Previously, setting signing_alg: "PS256" on an RSA key without a matching :key_algs map made verification infer RS256 from the key and reject the server's own tokens as :invalid_signature. An explicit :key_algs entry for that kid still wins.

[1.2.0] - 2026-07-08

Changed

  • Attesto.Config now raises a guiding error when the :issuer is not an https URL (RFC 8414 §2). Instead of a bare rejection, the message points developers at mkcert to serve a locally-trusted certificate so the issuer stays https — local development never needs to downgrade to plain http. There is deliberately no https-disable switch in the library.

[1.1.0] - 2026-07-07

Added

  • OpenID Connect Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA Core 1.0). New Attesto.CIBA primitive - the device grant's async sibling: Attesto.CIBA.Request.validate/3 runs the §7.1 backchannel authentication request rules (scope-with-openid, exactly-one-hint, ping/push client_notification_token entropy/length/charset, binding_message / user_code / requested_expiry shape) and verifies §7.1.1 signed authentication requests against the client's registered JWKS (all six REQUIRED claims enforced; FAPI-CIBA's 60-minute lifetime bound by default); issue/4 mints a 256-bit auth_req_id (only its hash is stored) with the §7.3 acknowledgement fields; approve/4 / deny/3 record the user's decision atomically and return the ping-mode §10.2 notification data; redeem/4 runs the token-endpoint state machine with the exact §11 vocabulary (authorization_pending / slow_down / expired_token / access_denied / invalid_grant), single-use, expiry-beats-approval, client- and DPoP-binding checked before consume. Plus Attesto.CIBA.Grant, the Attesto.CIBAStore behaviour (every transition a single atomic guarded operation; the poll interval is frozen into the record at issue time), and an ETS reference store.
  • Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 gains :require_iat, :require_jti, and :require_client_id_claim options for the CIBA signed-request profile (defaults preserve the RFC 9101 behaviour).
  • Discovery (Attesto.Discovery) accepts the CIBA Core §4 metadata: backchannel_authentication_endpoint, backchannel_token_delivery_modes_supported, backchannel_authentication_request_signing_alg_values_supported, and backchannel_user_code_parameter_supported.
  • OpenID Connect Front-Channel Logout 1.0 (OP side).
    • Attesto.FrontChannelLogout.logout_uri/3 builds the exact URI an OP logout page loads in an iframe for one Relying Party: the registered frontchannel_logout_uri with iss + sid query parameters appended whenever the session's sid is known (both together or neither, §2).
    • Attesto.LogoutSessionStore records both logout channels: an entry now carries frontchannel_logout_uri / frontchannel_session_required alongside the back-channel fields, and backchannel_logout_uri is optional — a row exists for any RP that registered at least one logout URI.
    • Attesto.Discovery accepts the frontchannel_logout_supported and frontchannel_logout_session_supported host members (§3).
  • OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0 (OP side).
    • Attesto.SessionState computes the §3.2 session_state value (lowercase-hex SHA-256 over client_id <> " " <> origin <> " " <> op_browser_state <> " " <> salt, dot, salt) plus the browser-form origin/1 of a redirect_uri and the salt / OP-browser-state generators — the pure computation the OP's authorization response and the check_session_iframe's JavaScript recomputation must agree on.
    • Attesto.Discovery accepts the check_session_iframe host member (§3.3).

[1.0.0] - 2026-07-04

First stable release; the public API is now under semantic versioning. No functional change from 0.13.0.

The authorization-server core (tokens, ID tokens, PKCE, DPoP, PAR, discovery, RP-Initiated and Back-Channel Logout) backs an OpenID Provider that passes the OpenID Foundation conformance suite for OpenID Connect Core (Basic), FAPI 2.0 Security Profile Final, FAPI 2.0 Message Signing Final, RP-Initiated Logout, and Back-Channel Logout.

[0.13.0] - 2026-06-23

Added

  • OpenID Connect Logout (RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 + Back-Channel Logout 1.0).
    • Attesto.LogoutToken mints a signed Back-Channel logout_token (§2.4): typ: "logout+jwt", the events claim {"http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {}}, iss/aud/ iat/jti/short-exp, at least one of sub/sid, and never a nonce.
    • Attesto.EndSession is the conn-free RP-Initiated Logout validator: parse/2 verifies the id_token_hint, resolves the Relying Party client_id (rejecting a client_id parameter that disagrees with the hint's aud), and extracts the session sub/sid; confirm_redirect/2 honors a post_logout_redirect_uri only on an exact match against the client's registered set and appends state — an unregistered or unidentifiable return URI is refused (no open redirect).
    • Attesto.IDToken gains a sid claim (:sid mint option, OIDC Back-Channel Logout §2.1) and verify_logout_hint/2, which validates a hint's signature
      • issuer while tolerating expiry and reading the RP from aud rather than requiring it up front (RP-Initiated Logout §2).
    • Attesto.LogoutSessionStore behaviour: the OP-side (sid, client_id) -> backchannel_logout_uri delivery map, with an atomic take_targets/1 (enumerate-and-delete) so concurrent logouts cannot double-deliver.
    • Discovery (Attesto.Discovery) gains end_session_endpoint, backchannel_logout_supported, and backchannel_logout_session_supported.

[0.12.0] - 2026-06-23

Added

  • RFC 8628 Device Authorization Grant. New Attesto.DeviceCode primitive (issue + the §3.5 polling state machine: authorization_pending / slow_down / expired_token / access_denied, expiry-beats-approval, single-use consume), Attesto.DeviceCode.Grant, the Attesto.DeviceCodeStore behaviour (every transition a single atomic guarded operation), and an ETS reference store. The user_code uses an ambiguity-free base-20 alphabet and is normalized + charset-validated before any store lookup. device_authorization_endpoint is now an accepted RFC 8414 metadata field.

[0.11.0] - 2026-06-22

Added

  • RFC 9470 Step-Up Authentication Challenge. New Attesto.StepUp + Attesto.StepUp.Requirement primitive: a requirement is accepted acr_values and/or a max_age freshness bound; evaluate/3 checks a verified token's acr / auth_time claims (conjunction, fail-closed on absent/malformed) and returns the §3 challenge params.
  • Attesto.Token.mint/3 accepts optional :acr / :auth_time, written as access-token claims (the carrier a resource server enforces step-up against).
  • Attesto.RefreshToken carries the original acr / auth_time across rotation unchanged, so a refresh-minted access token reports the real authentication event (auth_time is never re-stamped).
  • Attesto.Plug.OAuthError.insufficient_user_authentication/4 (the RFC 9470 §3 401 challenge) and a :step_up option on Attesto.Plug.Authenticate that enforces a per-route requirement after token verification.
  • acr_values_supported is now an accepted protected-resource-metadata host field (RFC 9728), so a resource server can advertise the acr values it can demand.

[0.10.0] - 2026-06-22

Added

  • RFC 8707 Resource Indicators. New Attesto.ResourceIndicator primitive (validate/1 for §2.1 absolute-URI syntax over the scalar/array resource parameter; authorize/2 for §2.2 allow-listing → :invalid_target).
  • Attesto.Token.mint/3's :audience option now accepts a list of resource identifiers, written as a JWT aud array (a single resource still collapses to a string). Token.verify already checks array membership, so a resource server validates that its own identifier is in aud.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationCode / Attesto.RefreshToken bind a resource set alongside scope; refresh rotation carries it and narrows it subset-only (a requested resource outside the granted set is :invalid_target).
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest parses and validates the resource parameter, surfacing a malformed value as a redirectable invalid_target error.

[0.9.0] - 2026-06-21

Changed

  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate bearer presentation methods are explicit and header-only by default. The new :bearer_methods option accepts :header / "header" and :body / "body"; it defaults to [:header]. A resource server that intentionally accepts RFC 6750 §2.2 form-body access_token credentials must opt in with bearer_methods: [:header, :body] and advertise the matching bearer_methods_supported metadata. URI-query bearer tokens remain unsupported. DPoP, mTLS, and host-provided :credential_from_conn fallback credentials are unchanged.

[0.8.1] - 2026-06-21

Changed

  • Attesto.Plug.OAuthError.insufficient_scope/4 now honors the transport hooks. The 403 scope-rejection path threads the same :send_error, :www_authenticate, and :no_store options unauthorized/4 already honored, so a resource server can override the 403 response envelope and inject a per-conn challenge (e.g. a request-derived RFC 9728 resource_metadata pointer) on the scope-rejection path, not just the authentication-rejection path. The insufficient_scope code, 403 status, and the error_description / scope challenge semantics remain owned by the renderer; the default response is byte-identical when no hooks are passed.
  • Attesto.Plug.RequireScopes now threads those transport hooks onto both the 403 insufficient_scope and the 401 invalid_token it renders, alongside the existing :resource_metadata pointer. Previously they were dropped, so a host could not override the scope-rejection envelope through this plug.

[0.8.0] - 2026-06-20

Added

  • Attesto.ProtectedResourceMetadata — renderer for the RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata document (the resource-server analogue of Attesto.Discovery). metadata/2 returns the string-keyed map a resource publishes at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource: the REQUIRED resource identifier (defaulting to config.audience, overridable via :resource) plus the nil-droppable RFC 9728 §2 host fields (authorization_servers, jwks_uri, scopes_supported, bearer_methods_supported, resource_signing_alg_values_supported, authorization_details_types_supported, the resource_name/documentation/ policy/ToS members, tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens, dpop_bound_access_tokens_required, dpop_signing_alg_values_supported, and signed_metadata). A present-but-malformed :resource (the REQUIRED member) fails fast with ArgumentError. Conn-free; mounting a serving endpoint is the host's concern.

  • RFC 9728 §5.1 resource_metadata challenge pointer. Attesto.Plug.OAuthError.unauthorized/4 and insufficient_scope/3,4 now append a resource_metadata="<url>" auth-param to the WWW-Authenticate challenge when a :resource_metadata opt is present, so a client refused with 401/403 can discover the resource's protected-resource metadata (and thereby its authorization server). Threaded through Attesto.Plug.Authenticate (:resource_metadata init opt) and Attesto.Plug.RequireScopes (:resource_metadata init opt). Omitted when unset.

  • Attesto.Token.mint/3 :audience option — a per-call override for the access token's aud claim, defaulting to config.audience. RFC 8707 §2: when a token request carries a resource indicator the access token's aud MUST identify that resource; the host derives the resource identifier and passes it here. The override is conn-free and does not mutate config, so one issuer can mint resource-audienced tokens for one grant without changing aud for any other. A present-but-malformed override (a nil, "", list, or other non-string) is rejected {:error, :invalid_audience} rather than minted, so a miswired resource cannot produce a malformed aud.

  • Attesto.IdentityAssertion — verification for the Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant (ID-JAG), the resource Authorization Server's half of draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04 (the grant behind MCP Enterprise-Managed Authorization). Conn-free and side-effect-free: verify/3 checks the assertion's signature against a caller-supplied trusted issuer JWKS (kid selection, RS256/PS256/ES*/EdDSA) and enforces the draft's claim rules — JOSE typ pinned to oauth-id-jag+jwt, iss matches the trusted issuer (NOT the client_id), aud is exactly this server's issuer (strict single value), the required iss/sub/aud/client_id/ jti/exp/iat claims, client_id binding, and exp/iat/nbf skew with an optional :max_lifetime_seconds bound. peek_issuer/1 reads the unverified iss so the caller can select the trusted issuer before verifying. The stateful concerns (JWKS fetch/cache, jti replay, subject resolution, error mapping to RFC 6749 invalid_grant) belong to the attesto_phoenix token layer. Distinct from private_key_jwt client auth (RFC 7523 §3) and the RFC 8693 token-exchange grant (which runs at the IdP).

[0.7.2] - 2026-06-16

Added

  • c:Attesto.CodeStore.get/1 (OPTIONAL callback) — read a stored authorization code WITHOUT consuming it (unlike take/1). Implemented by the bundled Attesto.CodeStore.ETS. Lets the token endpoint run read-only pre-checks (e.g. a holder-of-key requirement) without burning the single-use code.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationCode.dpop_bound?/2 — returns whether a stored code is bound to a DPoP key (RFC 9449 §10), via the store's non-consuming get/1. Used to surface a holder-of-key (invalid_request/invalid_dpop_proof) rejection ahead of the client-auth error at the token endpoint (FAPI2 ensure-holder-of-key-required), without consuming the code. Returns false when the store has no get/1, so behaviour is unchanged for stores that don't implement it.

[0.7.1] - 2026-06-14

Security

  • Refresh-rotation grace no longer replays an already-rotated successor. RefreshToken.rotate/3's within-grace idempotent-retry path returned the parent's cached successor without checking it was still the live, unconsumed leaf. After A → B → C, a replay of the captured parent A inside the grace window re-issued B (and minted a fresh access token from it) instead of detecting reuse — suppressing the OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.13 captured-token signal and forking a live chain. The grace retry now confirms the cached successor is still unconsumed; if it has been rotated onward, the replay is treated as reuse and the whole family is revoked.

Added

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest carries dpop_jkt. The validated request now exposes the RFC 9449 §10 dpop_jkt parameter, read from the EFFECTIVE (post-request-object-merge) params — so a signed request object's dpop_jkt is authoritative and an unsigned outer-query value is ignored when a request object is present. (Consumed by attesto_phoenix's authorization endpoint, which previously read it from the raw outer query.)

[0.7.0] - 2026-06-14

Added

  • Attesto.ClientIdMetadata — the pure core of Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD, draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-01). CIMD lets a client identify itself with no prior registration by using an HTTPS URL as its client_id; the authorization server dereferences that URL to a JSON client metadata document. This module is the conn-free, HTTP-free half: client_id_url?/1 and validate_client_id/1 enforce the draft §2 URL grammar (https, path required, no fragment/userinfo/dot-segments); validate_document/2 validates a fetched document (the client_id must equal the URL, no shared symmetric secret / client_secret_* auth method, a non-empty redirect_uris) and normalizes it into the same client shape the RFC 7591 registration path produces. The network half (SSRF-guarded fetch, caching) lives in attesto_phoenix; this module touches no socket and adds no dependency.
  • Attesto.Discovery advertises the client_id_metadata_document_supported authorization-server metadata field when the host enables it.

[0.6.16] - 2026-06-13

Fixed

  • Authorization-code redemption is now atomic. Attesto.AuthorizationCode.redeem/4 no longer records the reuse marker (consumed_success) itself; that moved to the new finalize/3, which the caller runs ONLY after the full token response is successfully built. So a code whose redemption validated but whose downstream issuance then failed (a mint or refresh-store fault, a host build_principal callback returning the subject under the wrong key) is left single-use-spent but NOT reuse-flagged: a replay is a clean invalid_grant instead of a false reuse attack that revokes the family, and a legitimate retry of a transient failure is not mistaken for an attack. Previously any post-validation failure permanently bricked the code AND marked it a successful redemption.

    Caller change: after a successful token response, call AuthorizationCode.finalize/3 to record the reuse marker. The bundled attesto_phoenix token endpoint (>= 0.7.7) does this. Stores that do not implement the optional mark_consumed/2 are unaffected.

[0.6.15] - 2026-06-12

Fixed

  • Attesto.RequestObject compares the JOSE typ header CASE-INSENSITIVELY (RFC 7515 §4.1.9 typ is a media type; RFC 2045 §5.1 media types are case-insensitive). The FAPI 2.0 Message Signing conformance suite signs request objects with a randomly-cased typ (e.g. OautH-auThZ-REQ+jWt) to exercise this; the previous exact-match rejected them as invalid_typ, failing the Message-Signing happy-flow / user-rejects tests at the PAR endpoint. A wrong type is still rejected; an absent typ is still governed by accepted_typ.

[0.6.14] - 2026-06-12

Fixed

  • Attesto.RequestObject.Policy.fapi_message_signing/0 no longer requires the JOSE typ header on signed request objects - it now accepts an absent typ (accepted_typ: ["oauth-authz-req+jwt", nil]) while still rejecting a wrong one. FAPI 2.0 Message Signing §5.3.1 ("shall accept that typ") and RFC 9101 §4 make typ RECOMMENDED, not mandatory, and the OpenID FAPI conformance suite signs its request objects with no typ header - so the previous strict pinning rejected every conformant pushed request object and failed the FAPI2 Message Signing certification at the PAR endpoint. typ is still validated for the RFC 9101 §10.8 explicit-typing defence when a client does send it.

Security

  • Attesto.DPoP now applies the strict canonical-base64url check to the proof's JOSE header (no padding, no non-significant trailing bits) that the Token/IDToken/ClientAssertion/RequestObject verifiers already apply, so a DPoP proof header cannot be presented in a non-canonical/aliased encoding. Defense-in-depth (the signature is verified over the real bytes regardless).

[0.6.13] - 2026-06-04

The FAPI 2.0 Message Signing surface: signed request objects (JAR, §5.3), signed authorization responses (JARM, §5.4), and token introspection with signed responses (§5.5). All additions are backward-compatible; behaviour is unchanged unless a caller opts into the new policy/options.

Added

  • Attesto.JARM — JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode (§5.4). Signs an authorization response (success: code/state; error: error/error_description/state) into a JWT carrying iss/aud/exp/ iat, using the keystore signing key (algorithm pinned, never none).
  • Attesto.Introspection — OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662). Access tokens are introspected statelessly with the full Attesto.Token verifier except the sender-binding proof match (the cnf is echoed for the resource server); refresh tokens are checked against an Attesto.RefreshStore (active only while unconsumed and unexpired). Never an error — an invalid, expired, revoked, or unknown token is reported inactive (no existence oracle).
  • Attesto.SignedIntrospection — the RFC 9701 signed introspection response (a JWT with iss/aud/iat and a token_introspection claim, JOSE header typ = "token-introspection+jwt").
  • Attesto.RequestObject.Policy gains require_request_object (false in generic/0, true in fapi_message_signing/0) and require_request_object?/1. Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 rejects a request that carries no signed request object when the policy requires one (redirectable invalid_request; non-redirectable when the client is untrusted, OIDC Core §3.1.2.6).
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest parses and validates response_mode (the RFC 6749 query plus the JARM modes jwt/query.jwt/fragment.jwt/ form_post.jwt); supported_response_modes/0 exposes the accepted set. Trusted redirectable errors carry the requested response_mode and the client_id so the transport can return the error as a JARM JWT.
  • Attesto.Discovery allowlists the RFC 9101 §10.5 metadata members require_signed_request_object and request_object_signing_alg_values_supported.
  • Attesto.SigningAlg.keystore_algs/1 — the unique signing algorithms across a keystore's verification keys (shared by the ID Token / JARM / introspection signing-algorithm metadata).
  • Attesto.Token.verify/3 accepts require_confirmation_binding: false to verify a token's signature/claims while skipping only the sender-binding proof match (used by introspection); the cnf shape is still validated.
  • Attesto.Introspection.introspect/3 accepts an :authorize predicate (response -> boolean) consulted with the active response before it is returned (RFC 7662 §4 / RFC 9701 §5: the AS MAY restrict which tokens a caller may introspect). A non-true return — or a raise — downgrades the response to %{"active" => false} so a caller not authorized for the token learns nothing about it. When omitted, every authenticated caller may introspect any token (the single-trust-domain default).
  • Attesto.Introspection surfaces the RFC 7662 sub/scope/client_id/cnf members for an active refresh token from the stored record's own data contract (Attesto.RefreshToken build context), when present, so a resource server — and an :authorize policy — can decide per refresh token rather than allow/deny every refresh token wholesale. A store that does not populate them yields the minimal active+exp response.

Security

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 now judges the OIDC openid-scope gate for the require_nonce policy on the EFFECTIVE (post-merge) request, so a direct JAR carrying scope=openid only inside the signed request object can no longer bypass the host's nonce requirement. A plain OAuth request (no openid scope) remains un-nonce-constrained.
  • Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 rejects a signed request object whose aud is an array containing any non-string member (RFC 7519 §4.1.3), rather than accepting it on a single matching member — matching the hardened Token/IDToken/JARM audience handling.
  • Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 rejects a request object that itself carries a request or request_uri claim (RFC 9101 §4 forbids them) instead of silently dropping them, so a nested-request smuggle fails closed at the verifier.

[0.6.12] - 2026-06-03

Added

  • Attesto.RequestObject.Policy — a data-only JAR verification policy for signed authorization request objects (RFC 9101). generic/0 is the OpenID Connect §6.1 baseline (the default: nbf/exp/typ not required); fapi_message_signing/0 is the FAPI 2.0 Message Signing §5.3.1 profile (nbf required ≤60 min past, exp required ≤60 min after nbf, JOSE header typ = "oauth-authz-req+jwt"). Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 accepts a :request_object_policy option (default %Policy{}, generic) and threads it into Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3. An aud that is an array containing the issuer is already accepted. Behaviour is unchanged unless a caller opts into the FAPI profile.

[0.6.11] - 2026-06-03

Added

  • :accepted_algs option on Attesto.ClientAssertion.verify/5 and Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 (default Attesto.SigningAlg.fapi_algs/0), so the accepted client-authentication / request-object signature algorithms are caller-supplied policy rather than a hardcoded constant. The default preserves current behaviour.
  • Attesto.SigningAlg.default_client_algs/0 as a named helper for the default client-presented signature verification policy.
  • Strict JAR policy options on Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 for the FAPI Message Signing 2.0 (§5.3.1) / RFC 9101 profile: :require_nbf, :max_nbf_age_seconds, :require_exp, :max_lifetime_seconds, and :accepted_typ (e.g. "oauth-authz-req+jwt"). :require_nbf/:require_exp demand a non-negative integer NumericDate (a missing or malformed value fails); :max_lifetime_seconds requires both nbf and exp anchors. These default to the prior lenient behaviour, so callers opt into strictness with explicit policy.

Fixed

  • Attesto.RequestObject.verify/3 now honours nbf as a not-before claim (RFC 7519 §4.1.5): a request object with nbf in the future is rejected as :not_yet_valid even in lenient mode (clock skew tolerated).

[0.6.10] - 2026-06-02

Changed

  • Require a single-valued string aud in client-authentication assertions (FAPI 2). An array aud is now rejected even when it contains an accepted value, and the string must match an expected audience exactly.

[0.6.9] - 2026-06-02

Changed

  • Restrict client-authentication assertions (private_key_jwt) and request objects to the FAPI 2 signing algorithms PS256, ES256, and EdDSA. Assertions or request objects signed with RS256 are now rejected. Attesto.SigningAlg exposes the permitted set via fapi_algs/0. The provider's own token signing (allowed/0) is unaffected and still admits RS256.

[0.6.8] - 2026-06-02

Fixed

  • Canonicalize DPoP htu URI comparison by ignoring query/fragment, normalizing scheme and host case, and treating an explicit HTTPS default port as equivalent to an omitted port. Non-HTTPS URIs, host/path mismatches, and non-default port mismatches remain rejected.

[0.6.7] - 2026-06-01

Fixed

  • Accept DPoP proof iat values up to 60 seconds ahead of the server clock, matching Attesto's JWT verifier clock-skew policy. Proofs remain short-lived through max_age_seconds, and replay-cache TTLs now cover the full acceptance window.

[0.6.6] - 2026-06-01

Fixed

  • Sign PS256 JWTs with the RFC 7518 salt length (32 bytes for SHA-256) instead of JOSE/OpenSSL's maximum salt length. This makes PS256 access tokens and ID Tokens verifiable by strict FAPI/OIDF validators while keeping Attesto's key-derived algorithm policy unchanged.
  • Treat signed authorization request object parameters as authoritative (RFC 9101 §6.3). When a request JWT is present, unsigned query parameters no longer supplement missing signed parameters such as PKCE inputs.
  • Require signed request objects to carry iss, matching client_id, and a configured aud, preventing cross-client or cross-issuer replay of otherwise valid request objects.
  • Reject access-token-shaped payloads during ID Token verification even when the access token JOSE typ header is intentionally disabled.

[0.6.5] - 2026-06-01

Fixed

  • Allow an authorization code that was not pre-bound with dpop_jkt to be redeemed at the token endpoint with a DPoP proof. Codes explicitly bound with dpop_jkt still require the exact same proof key at redemption. This matches FAPI-style DPoP flows where the authorization request does not pre-bind the code, but the token endpoint proof sender-constrains the access token being minted.

[0.6.4] - 2026-06-01

Fixed

  • Load keystore modules before checking optional callbacks such as verification_pems/0, key_algs/0, and signing_alg/0. Cold modules now advertise and use their configured per-key algorithms deterministically instead of briefly falling back to inferred RSA RS256 metadata.

[0.6.3] - 2026-06-01

Added

  • Allow OAuth authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414) hosts to advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported and token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported. These are host capability declarations; Attesto still drops nil values and ignores unlisted metadata keys.

[0.6.2] - 2026-06-01

Fixed

  • Unsigned OpenID Connect request objects (request JWTs with alg: "none") are now rejected with the redirectable request_not_supported error instead of invalid_request_object. Attesto still deliberately does not accept unsigned request objects; this change makes the unsupported-feature signal match OIDC Core §3.1.2.6 and the OpenID conformance suite.

[0.6.1] - 2026-05-31

Added

  • Attesto.Test.DPoPVerifier - a server-side DPoP verification harness for host application suites, the counterpart to Attesto.Test.DPoP. From a plain request description (method, url, headers) it verifies the presented DPoP proof and, when verify_token: true, the access token, returning {:ok, verified} or an {:error, challenge} map carrying the HTTP status, the WWW-Authenticate challenge, and an optional DPoP-Nonce. It does not reimplement RFC 9449: it delegates every decision to the production verifiers Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 and Attesto.Token.verify/3, and mirrors the resource server's scheme handling (a DPoP-bound token presented as Bearer surfaces a DPoP challenge, RFC 9449 §7.1; a missing required nonce surfaces use_dpop_nonce, §8). It depends on neither Plug, Phoenix, nor any HTTP client, so it runs from any ExUnit suite.

  • Attesto.Test.DPoP - DPoP test fixtures for host application suites (RFC 9449). Ships under lib/ so a consumer can call it from its test/ tree without depending on Attesto's own test support. generate_key/1 mints a proof key (EC P-256 / ES256 by default); mint_access_token/4 mints a DPoP-sender-constrained access token bound to that key via cnf.jkt (RFC 7800); proof/4 builds a valid proof JWT for a (htm, htu) pair, optionally carrying ath (RFC 9449 §4.3) and a server nonce (§8); invalid_proof/5 builds a proof with a single deliberate defect (:wrong_htm, :wrong_htu, :missing_ath, :expired) for negative tests. Every fixture is built through the same primitives the production code uses (Attesto.Token.mint/3, Attesto.DPoP.compute_jkt/1, Attesto.DPoP.compute_ath/1, Attesto.SigningAlg.infer/1, JOSE.JWS), and embeds only the proof key's public half (RFC 9449 §4.2), so a fixture is correct by construction against Attesto.DPoP.verify_proof/2 and stays in step with it.

[0.6.0]

Added

  • Attesto.IDToken.mint/3 rounds out the OpenID Connect Core §2 ID Token claim set: auth_time (REQUIRED when the request asked for it or carried max_age), acr, amr, and azp are accepted as optional inputs and omitted when absent. Arbitrary additional claims requested through the OIDC Core §5.5 claims parameter or a host userinfo mapping are supplied via :extra_claims, a string-keyed map merged after the protocol claims. The merge is non-overriding: a key colliding with a reserved protocol claim (iss, sub, aud, exp, iat, nonce, azp, auth_time, acr, amr, at_hash, c_hash) is rejected with :reserved_claim_conflict, and a non-map or non-string-keyed value with :invalid_extra_claims. at_hash/c_hash (OIDC Core §3.1.3.6, §3.3.2.11) were already present.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 - :require_nonce option (default false). When true, a request with no nonce is rejected with a redirectable invalid_request error (OIDC Core §3.1.2.1); when false, nonce stays OPTIONAL and is carried through unenforced (RFC 6749 keeps the code flow at SHOULD). The OP policy is the host's, signalled per call.
  • Authorization-code reuse detection (OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.13 / RFC 6749 §4.1.2). Attesto.AuthorizationCode.issue/3 accepts an optional :family_id that links a code to the refresh-token family it spawns; it rides onto the redeemed Attesto.AuthorizationCode.Grant (new :family_id field). Attesto.CodeStore gains an OPTIONAL reuse-tracking pair: a mark_consumed/2 callback and a third take/1 return value {:error, :consumed, meta}. When a store implements them, redeem/4 records the spent code's family_id/subject and surfaces a later replay of that code as {:error, {:reuse, meta}} so the caller can revoke the descendant family. The addition is purely additive and fail-safe: a store that does not implement the pair keeps the {:ok, entry} | :error take/1 contract and a re-presented code stays {:error, :invalid_grant}, with single-use atomicity unchanged.
  • Refresh-token rotation grace for honest retries. Attesto.RefreshToken.rotate/3 now returns the same successor when the just-consumed parent is immediately retried by the same client, DPoP binding, and narrowed scope within :rotation_grace_seconds (default 10). Outside that window, or on any mismatch, reuse still revokes the whole family. Attesto.RefreshStore entries now carry :consumed_at and :successor, and stores may implement remember_successor/3 to support the idempotent retry path.
  • Attesto.Plug.Authenticate accepts a :credential_from_conn fallback hook for host-owned credential channels such as first-party cookies. The Authorization header remains authoritative when present; the callback is consulted only when no usable header credential exists.
  • Attesto.Plug.OAuthError supports transport hooks (:send_error, :www_authenticate, :no_store) so hosts can preserve their API error envelope while Attesto owns the OAuth status/challenge semantics.

Changed

  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest.validate/2 - prompt tokens are now validated against the fixed OIDC set {none, login, consent, select_account}; an unknown token is a redirectable invalid_request error (OIDC Core §3.1.2.1). The parsed list is still exposed for the controller, which enforces semantics such as prompt=none (the OP MUST NOT show UI).
  • The former consume/2 callback on Attesto.RefreshStore receives rotation options such as the claim timestamp and returns consumed records with enough metadata for retry/reuse decisions. This is the intentional 0.6 store-contract change.

Security

  • Closed a JWS signature-malleability gap in the compact-form boundary of both Attesto.Token.verify/3 and Attesto.IDToken.verify/3. The boundary previously checked each segment against the base64url alphabet only (RFC 4648 §5), which accepts a non-canonical final character: the 342-byte RS256 signature segment is a partial quantum (342 rem 4 == 2) whose last character carries four unused low-order bits, so several distinct characters decode to the same signature bytes (RFC 4648 §3.5). JOSE's liberal decoder normalises such a variant and verifies it, so a tampered serialization that is not byte-identical to the issuer's token was accepted. The boundary now requires each segment to round-trip through Base.url_decode64/2 and Base.url_encode64/2 byte-identically, rejecting padding, non-alphabet bytes, and non-zero unused trailing bits in one check, before the token reaches JOSE. Canonical unpadded base64url tokens are unaffected; the empty signature segment of an alg:none token still round-trips and is classified :invalid_signature.

[0.5.1]

Added

  • Attesto.IDToken - mint and verify OpenID Connect ID Tokens (OIDC Core 1.0 §2), including at_hash/c_hash generation, nonce, and the client-id audience and generic JWT typ that distinguish an ID Token from an RFC 9068 access token. Shares the keystore/kid/RS256 path with Attesto.Token.
  • Attesto.AuthorizationRequest - protocol-shape validation for the authorization endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.1, OIDC Core §3.1.2.1, PKCE §4.3): response_type, client_id, exact-match redirect_uri, scope/openid detection, and the PKCE parameters.
  • Attesto.OpenIDDiscovery - the OpenID Provider Metadata document (OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3) served from /.well-known/openid-configuration, built on top of Attesto.Discovery.
  • mix check alias running formatting, --warnings-as-errors compile, property tests, and Credo strict in one command.

Security

  • DPoP replay cache: closed a race in the expired-entry re-admission path. Attesto.DPoP.ReplayCache.check_and_record/2 performed a non-atomic lookup-then-insert, so at the exact TTL boundary two concurrent callers could both re-admit a just-expired jti and a proof could be replayed more than once. Re-admission is now a single atomic compare-and-delete (:ets.select_delete/2 guarded on expiry) followed by insert_new/2, so exactly one caller wins and the losers see :replay.
  • Token verification now enforces canonical compact-JWS form at its own boundary. Attesto.Token.verify/3 and Attesto.IDToken.verify/3 reject any = padding or non-base64url byte in a compact segment before the token reaches JOSE, refusing to verify a serialization the issuer never emitted (JOSE's decoder would otherwise tolerantly normalize trailing padding). Unpadded base64url tokens are unaffected.

Fixed

  • Documentation: the authorization-code single-use note now links the Attesto.CodeStore take/1 callback with the correct callback reference, clearing a docs-build warning.